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DENATURALIZATION OF NAZI WAR CRIMINALS: IS THERE
SUFFICIENT JUSTICE FOR THOSE WHO WOULD
NOT DISPENSE JUSTICE?*
INTRODUCTION
Following the euphoria of victory in 1945, the United States Government1
pledged with other nations to deliver Nazi war criminals 2 to a swift and
* The author wishes to thank the members of the Special Investigations Unit at the
Department of Justice who worked under the authority of former Attorney General
Benjamin R. Civiletti, and are currently directed by Allan A. Ryan, Jr. Special
appreciation is due to Jeffrey N. Mausner, Esq., Eli M. Rosenbaum, Esq., Ms. Diane Kelly,
and former Deputy Director Martin Mendelsohn, all of whom energetically cooperated in
this effort.
1. The terms "United States Government" and "Government" are used interchange-
ably herein.
2. The terms "Nazi" and "war criminal" are not synonymous. A Nazi is someone who
belonged or belongs to the political party formally referred to as the National Sozialistiche
Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (NSDAP is translated as the National Socialist German Worker
Party.). For a capsulized description of the Nazi Party at its birth and of the German
regime inspired by the Party, see The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69 (Nuremberg, Germany
1946).
A war criminal, according to the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg,
see note 4 infra, was someone guilty of at least one of the following: "crimes against
peace," "war crimes," and "crimes against humanity." Conspiracy to commit one of the
above acts also constituted a crime. The technical definitions of the charges to which the
Tribunal adhered were:
(a) CRIMES AGAINST PEACE: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or waging
of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or
assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of
any of the foregoing;
(b) WAR CRIMES: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such
violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to
slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory,
murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages,
plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages,
or devastation not justified by military necessity;
(c CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population,
before or during the war; or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in
execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal,
whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated.
Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation
or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are
responsible for all acts committed by any persons in execution of such plan.
CHARTER OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL art. 6, 59 Stat. 1544, 1547, E.A.S. No.
472 (1945) (footnote omitted). For an analysis of the scope of these crimes, see
Garcia-Mora, The Present Status of Political Offenses in the Law of Extradition and
Asylum, 14 U. PITT. L. REV. 371, 394-96 (1953). See also Report of June 7, 1945, to
President Harry S. Truman from Justice Robert H. Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the
United States in the Prosecution of Axis War Criminals, reprinted in 39 AM. J. INT' L L.
178, 185 (Supp. 1945) (Jackson expressed the mood and motives behind the charges: "We
propose to punish acts which have been regarded as criminal since the time of Cain and
(39)
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sobering justice.3 While this pledge was dramatically realized at the Nuremberg
Trials,4 the net at Nuremberg caught only a few of the many deserving to be
tried for war crimes.5 Steadfast to its pledge, United States immigration policy
barred fugitive war criminals from entering onto United States territory while
have been so written in every civilized code."). For purposes of simplicity, further
references to war crimes will encompass the technical definitions employed at Nuremberg
for crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
At Nuremberg, a Nazi was not necessarily a war criminal because membership in
the Party did not constitute a war crime. Membership in contingents of the Nazi regime,
such as the Gestapo, was sufficient, however, for a guilty verdict. In attempting to justify
this distinction the Tribunal said, "[i]f satsified of the criminal guilt of any organization or
group, this Tribunal should not hesitate to declare it to be criminal because the theory of
'group criminality' is new, or because it might be unjustly applied by some subsequent
tribunals." The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 132 (Nuremberg, Germany 1946). But cf.
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 178-79 (1951) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) ("The fact that the technique of guilt by association was used in the
prosecutions at Nuremberg does not make it congenial to our constitutional scheme. Guilt
under our system of government is personal. When we make guilt vicarious we borrow
from systems alien to ours and ape our enemies.") (footnote omitted).
3. The pledge was formalized by the London Agreement "for the Prosecution and
Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis," 8 August 1945, 59 Stat.
1544, E.A.S. No. 472. The London Agreement was signed by representatives of the United
States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. See
Robinson, The International Military Tribunal and the Holocaust: Some Legal Reflections,
7 ISRAEL L. REV. 1, 3 (1972). See also Lerner, The Convention on the Non-Applicability of
Statutory Limitations to War Crimes, 4 ISRAEL L. REV. 512, 514-15 (1969) (outlining the
legal events which led to the London Agreement).
4. The Nuremberg trials, the precedent for modern international criminal law,
resulted in eighteen convictions of individuals and four findings that membership in
particular Nazi organizations constituted criminal activity. Subsequently, several other
tribunals were formed at Nuremberg. These tribunals convicted a total of 161 persons for
war crimes. H.R. REP. No. 1452, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4700, 4705 [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ACT OF
OCT. 30, 1978]. See generally TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY
TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, OCT. 1946-APR. 1949 (15-volume set
detailing the proceedings of the bulk of the cases at Nuremberg).
In addition, trial in absentia was adopted at Nuremberg because the defendant,
Martin Bormann, could not be located. The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 76 (Nuremberg,
Germany 1946). See S. WIESENTHAL, THE MURDERERS AMONG Us 319-36 (1968). The
Tribunal also refused to accept the defense of "superior orders" as justification for the
defendants' wartime acts. See Lapidoth, Book Review, 2 ISRAEL L. REV. 295, 296 (1967)
(reviewing Y. DINSTEIN, THE DEFENCE OF "OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS" IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1965)). The controversies about what happened at Nuremberg still rage.
Compare B. SMITH, REACHING JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG (1977) with Ferencz, Book Review,
74 AM. J. INT'L L. 228, 230 (1980). See also Piper, Berlin Court Rejects Hess Release Plea,
Baltimore Sun, Feb. 25, 1981, § 1, at 2, col. 6.
5. Several major Nazi war criminals escaped to South America immediately after
World War II including: Brazil, see N.Y. Times, June 22, 1979, § 1, at 7, col. 3; Argentina,
see N.Y. Times, July 6, 1977, § 1, at 8, col. 2; Bolivia and Chile, see Kandell, Nazis Safer in
South America Today, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1975, § 1, at 1, col. 4; and Paraguay, see Cap6,
Where is Dr. Mengele?, Washington Post, Sept. 4, 1979, § 1, at 19, col. 1. With the
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it belatedly 6 admitted the immigration of survivors from Nazi terror. 7 In utter
defiance of government policy, however, a surprising number of war criminals
exception of Paraguay, which revoked the citizenship of Dr. Joseph Mengele, these
countries all harbor fugitive war criminals in violation of their respective extradition
treaties. For an explanation of the concept of extradition, see note 38 infra.
Though less frequent and overt, the United States also has sheltered Nazi war
criminals. See H. BLUM, WANTED! THE SEARCH FOR NAZIS IN AMERICA (1977) (expos6 of
Anthony DeVito, United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) investiga-
tor who relentessly investigated the immigration cases of Ryan, Trifa, Artukovic,
Maikovskis, and Soobzokov; see notes 133-140 and accompanying text infra); L.A. Times,
Dec. 28, 1979, at 5, col. 1. See also Soobzokov v. CBS, Inc., No. 78-CIV-4908 (S.D.N.Y.,
filed Oct. 18, 1978) (pending libel action against the author and publisher of Blum's book).
6. In the 1930's and early 1940's, when many intended victims still possessed the
freedom to escape from Hitler's regime, official United States immigration law effectively
hampered them from seeking refuge in the United States. In 1924, Congress had
established restrictive quotas based on a national origin system in reaction to the massive
influx of immigrants to the United States around the turn of the century. See H. R. REP.
No. 1365, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in [1952] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1653,
1671-73 [hereinafter cited as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT I.
See generally Bernard, The Quota System and Its Effects, reprinted in IMMIGRATION AS A
FACTOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 192 (0. Handlin ed. 1959); Higham, The Politics of
Immigration Restriction, reprinted in 1 IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY L. REV. 1 (1977).
Nonetheless, both political analysts and congressmen have concluded that former
President Franklin Roosevelt, who knew of the atrocities which were occurring during the
1930's and 1940's, at least could have taken temporary or covert steps to protect some of
the intended victims of Hitler's Final Solution. See, e.g., A. MORSE, WHILE SIX MILLION
DIED: A CHRONICLE OF AMERICAN APATHY 17-22, 28, 37, 60-62, 65, 130, 140, 270-88
(1968) ("The United States not only insisted upon its immigration law throughout the
Nazi era, but administered it with severity and callousness." Id. at 49); Letter from
William Lehman, M.C. & Hamilton Fish, Jr., M.C. to President Ronald Reagan (Feb. 6,
1981) (signed by 104 Congressmen) ("Clearly, our government must not revert to the
intolerable situation of years past, when it seemed to be condoning by inaction the horrors
of the Holocaust.").
7. The Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009, as
amended by Act of June 16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219, an amendment to the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976), relaxed the quotas from
1948 to 1952 to permit the immigration of over 400,000 "displaced persons." Relaxation of
the quotas was offset by the provision which charged quotas in future years for the
number admitted by virtue of the Displaced Persons Act. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT, supra note 6, at 1674. See also Brief for Appellee at
17-19, United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979).
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managed to immigrate and establish peaceful and inconspicuous lives within
our borders;8 most epitomize a newly-discovered role of model citizenry.
9
Thirty-three years after the judgment at Nuremberg, in response to
resounding pressure from Congress, ° former Attorney General Benjamin R.
8. See H. BLUM, supra note 5, at 22-26; L.A. Times, Dec. 28, 1979, at 5, col. 1. Most
alleged war criminals were admitted to the United States under either the Displaced
Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009, as amended by Act of June 16,
1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219 (expired 1952), or the Refugee Relief Act of 1953,
Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67 Stat. 400 (expired 1956). See United States v. Fedorenko, 101 S.
Ct. 737 (1981) (admission under the Displaced Persons Act); United States v. Karklins,
No. 81-460 (C.D. Cal., filed Jan. 29, 1981) (admission under the Refugee Relief Act). But
see In re Artukovic, No. A7-095-961 (Bd. Imm. App., filed March 7, 1980) (admission in
1948 as temporary visitor for pleasure); In re Kaminskas, No. A6-659-477 (INS,
Hartford, Conn., filed Oct. 13, 1976) (admission under general quota system). See also
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ACT OF OCT. 30, 1978, supra note 4, at 4702; Eilberg,
Foreword to Immigration Symposium IV, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1978).
If it is proved that any of these persons who came, for example, via the Displaced
Persons Act of 1948, was a war criminal, see note 2 supra, then that individual would be in
violation of the Act because an amended section, Act of June 16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555,
§ 13, 64 Stat. 219, 227, explicitly barred entrance to "any person who is or has been a
member of or participated in any movement which is or has been hostile to the United
States . . . or to any person who advocated or assisted in the persecution of any person
because of race, religion, or national origin ... " Further, § 2 of the Displaced Persons Act
of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009, defines "displaced person" in accordance with
Annex I of the Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, which excludes
from that definition persons who can be shown "(a) to have assisted the enemy in
persecuting civil populations of countries, Members of the United Nations; or (b) to have
voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the outbreak of the second world war in their
operations against the United Nations." United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 913
(S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd; 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 101 S. Ct. 737
(1981) (quoting part II of Annex I of the Constitution of the International Refugee
Organization, the committee established by the United Nations for the purpose of
resettling persons displaced by World War II.).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 896 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd,
597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 101 S. Ct. 737 (1981) (In the district
court, Judge Roettger found that the defendant, a concentration camp guard allegedly
responsible for several inmate deaths, "came to America in 1949 and has been a
respectable resident ever since," and that his fellow workers viewed him as an " 'excellent'
worker" and "'real gentleman' with no apparent prejudices of any type."); Second
Amended Complaint of July 12, 1978, United States v. Trifa, No. 5-70924 (E.D. Mich.,
Sept. 4, 1980) (The defendant, Bishop Valerian Trifa, is a leader of the Eastern Orthodox
Church. Despite his exemplary behavior today, the Government has alleged that Trifa
openly encouraged and participated in the persecution of thousands of Christians and
Jews in Bucharest, Romania between 1936 and 1941 in his official capacity as leader of
the Iron Guard).
10. See Act of Oct. 30, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-549, 92 Stat. 2065 (The Act of Oct. 30,
1978 amends 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1101-1503 (1976), to include in the class of deportable aliens, see note 35 infra,
individuals who "ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise participated in the persecution of
any person because of race, religion, national origin, or political opinion" between March
23, 1933 and March 8, 1945 as directed by or in association with the Nazi Government or
any of its allies. 92 Stat. at 2065-66). This amendment does not merely repeat the
prohibitions contained in the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat.
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Civiletti closed the door on past abortive" attempts by the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS) to correct the weak enforcement of official
immigration policy. On September 4, 1979, the Attorney General ordered 12 the
attachment of a Special Investigations Unit to the Criminal Division of the
Department of Justice, symbolizing an enhanced and consolidated attack aimed
at locating these fugitives. The Unit's limited but formidable task is to expel
war criminals from the United States.
13
1009, as amended by Act of June 16, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219, or the
Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67 Stat. 400; it allows the Government to
bring immigration suits against an alleged war criminal who entered the United States as
part of the general allotment of quotas for his country of origin. See LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE ACT OF OCT. 30, 1978, supra note 4 (The Act of Oct. 30, 1978 would be "eliminating
an undesirable loophole in current U.S. immigration law." Id. at 4702). Solely because of
this amendment to § 1251(a), the Government was able to move to overturn a stay of
deportation granted in 1959 to one war criminal who had been admitted to the United
States as a temporary visitor pursuant to the 1924 version of the Act. See In re Artukovic,
No. A7-095-961 (Bd. Imm. App., filed March 7, 1980); see also note 38 infra.
11. See N.Y. Times, Aug. 7, 1977, § 1, at 20, col. 1 (General Accounting Office (GAO)
official charging that prior to 1973, the INS perfunctorily investigated reports of Nazi war
criminals in the United States). By 1977, INS established a Special Litigation Unit to
investigate alleged Nazi war criminals, see LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ACT OF OCT. 30,
1978, supra note 4, at 4702, but the Unit did not perform as efficiently as might be
desired. Interview with Martin Mendelsohn, former Deputy Director of the Special
Investigations Unit, Criminal Division, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 4,
1979).
The poor enforcement record of the Special Litigation Unit was not entirely
caused by the inefficiency of the INS. See Anderson, 'Paperclip': Some Nazis' Ticket to
U.S., Washington Post, Oct. 22, 1979, § 2, at 14, col. 4 (Jack Anderson alleging that
Operation Paperclip, sponsored by the Government, circumvented the immigration laws
by bringing Nazi scientists - including alleged war criminals - to settle in the United
States); Hunter, Report Says Ex-Nazi Aided U.S., N.Y. Times, May 17, 1978, § 1, at 19,
col. 3 (Rep. Joshua Eilberg calling for a probe into GAO reports which charged that the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation used alleged Nazi
war criminals as "sources").
12. Order of the Attorney General, Transfer of Functions of the Special Litigation
Unit Within the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the Department of Justice to
the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, No. 851-79, Sept. 4, 1979.
13. Id. It must be emphasized that trying the alleged war criminals for war crimes is
not within the scope of the Special Investigations Unit. Apart from Nuremberg, see note 4
supra, the United States had prosecuted alleged war criminals for the criminal charges of
war crimes, see Lador-Lederer, Book Review, 13 ISRAEL L. REV. 549, 561 (1978); McCauliff,
The Reach of the Constitution: American Peace-Time Court in West Berlin, 55 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 682, 704-05 (1980), but its current activities with respect to war criminals are
limited solely to remedying immigration violations incurred by war criminals when they
entered United States territory.
19811
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Section 340 of the Immigration and Nationality Act 14 establishes the civil
sanction of denaturalization when the "priceless treasure"' 5 of American
citizenship 1 6 has been conferred illegally. When prescribed, denaturalization
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (1976) (the Act). In relevant part, section 340 reads:
(a) ...It shall be the duty of the United States attorneys for the respective
districts, upon affidavit showing good cause therefor, to institute proceedings in any
court specified in subsection (a) of section 1421 [Jurisdiction to naturalize] of this title
in the judicial district in which the naturalized citizen may reside at the time of
bringing suit, for the purpose of revoking and setting aside the order admitting such
person to citizenship and cancelling the certificate of naturalization on the ground
that such order and certificate of naturalization were illegally procured or were
procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful misrepresentation, and such
revocation and setting aside of the order admitting such person to citizenship and
such canceling of certificate of naturalization shall be effective as of the original date
of the order and certificate, respectively: Provided, That refusal on the part of a
naturalized citizen within a period of ten years following his naturalization to testify
as a witness in any proceeding before a congressional committee concerning his
subversive activities, in a case where such person has been convicted of contempt for
such refusal, shall be held to constitute a ground for revocation of such person's
naturalization under this subsection as having been procured by concealment of a
material fact or by willful misrepresentation ...
(b) ...The party to whom was granted the naturalization alleged to have been
illegally procured or procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful
misrepresentation shall, in any such proceedings under subsection (a) of this section,
have sixty days' personal notice, unless waived by such party, in which to make
answers to the petition of the United States ....
15. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 791 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting), quoted in
United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946, 952 (5th Cir. 1979), affd on other grounds, 101
S. Ct. 737 (1981).
16. The Constitution does not define "citizenship", although the fourteenth amend-
ment does provide that "(a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States ...are
citizens of the United States. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See M. KONVITZ, CIVIL
RIGHTS IN IMMIGRATION 132-158 (1953); Countryman, Justice Douglas and American
Citizenship, 15 GONZAGA L. REV. 957, 961-71 (1980) (development of judicial interpreta-
tion of the citizenship clause).
There are various methods by which a person can claim the status of American
citizenship. Jus soli - or acquiring citizenship by birth in the country - is recognized in
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. Jus sanguinis - or acquiring
citizenship through a natural parent who is a citizen - is also statutorily acceptable in
the United States. 8 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976). See generally 3 J. MOORE, A DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 276-89 (1906). Aside from these effortless methods, a person not tied
to the United States by place of birth, nor by blood, may become a citizen in accordance
with a specialized statute - the process of naturalization. See 8 U.S.C. § 1421-1459
(1976); LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT, supra note 6, at
1735-41. Under special circumstances, a person may acquire citizenship after birth other
than by judicial naturalization (e.g., marriage to a U.S. citizen). See 3 C. GORDON & H.
ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE §§ 18.1-18.7 (rev. ed. 1980) Ihereinafter
cited as GORDON & ROSENFIELD]. Cf. SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE
POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST (March 1, 1981) (recom-
mending that naturalization be conducted in an Article I administrative court).
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results in severing a naturalized 17 American from his citizenship." As is often
the case, the statute is effectually silent as to the procedures required for its
implementation. Thus, the burden fell to the courts to interpret the congression-
17. See note 16 supra.
18. For the historical and current implementation of denaturalization procedure, see
3 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 16, at §§ 20.1-20.6; Burke, Interpretative Results of
Wartime Denaturalization Proceedings, 18 S. CAL. L. REV. 110, 111-14 (1944); Roche,
Pre-Statutory Denaturalization, 35 CORNELL L.Q. 120 (1949) [hereinafter cited as
Pre-Statutory Denaturalization]; Roche, Statutory Denaturalization: 1906-1951, 13 U. PITT.
L. REV. 276 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Statutory Denaturalization]; Developments in the
Law, Immigration and Nationality, 66 HARV. L. REV. 643, 717-31 (1953). Portions of most
of these materials are outmoded because of subsequent changes in immigration law. See
Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 18, 75 Stat. 656 (amending sections 340(a) and
340(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1954)); Comment,
Constitutional Law - Denaturalization Under the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, 51 MICH. L. REV. 881 (1953); note 50 infra.
Denaturalization, a judicial procedure, has been expressly governed by statute
since 1906. Act of June 29, 1906, Pub. L. No. 59-338, § 15, 34 Stat. 601, as amended by
Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, § 338, 54 Stat. 1158, as amended by
Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, § 340, 66 Stat. 260 (1952), as
amended by Act of Sept. 3, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-779, § 18, 68 Stat. 1232, as amended by
Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 18, 75 Stat. 656. Section 340 of the Act is the
sole method of denaturalization. United States v. Zucca, 351 U.S. 91, 99 (1956) (quoting
Bindczyck v. Finucane, 342 U.S. 76, 83-84 (1951)).
Denaturalization should be distinguished from expatriation and deportation.
Expatriation, a judicial procedure, deprives a native-born or naturalized citizen of the
rights and privileges of American citizenship. Unlike the denaturalized alien, the
expatriate is deemed to have been a citizen until he was divorced from his citizenship. On
the other hand, the Government annuls the citizenship of the denaturalized individual so
that he is treated as if he never became a citizen. The ramifications of this legal fiction are
significant in resolving the citizenship status of those individuals who derived American
citizenship solely from either the expatriate or the denaturalized person. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1451(e) (1976); 3 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 16, at §§ 20.1-20.12. See also Note,
Revocation of Citizenship and the Void Ab Initio Concept, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 674 (1950).
Governed by a statute which has inspired much inter-branch controversy,
expatriation may follow when a native-born or naturalized American "voluntarily" does
one of several "renunciating" acts. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481-1489 (1976); Vance v. Terrazas,
444 U.S. 252 (1980); Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971); Afroyim v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 253
(1967) (reversing Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958)); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163
(1964); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
129 (1958); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). See generally 3 GORDON & ROSENFIELD,
supra note 16, at §§ 20.7-20.12; Duvall, Expatriation Under United States Law, Perez to
Afroyim: The Search for a Philosophy of American Citizenship, 56 VA. L. REV. 408 (1970);
Gordon, The Citizen and the State: Power of Congress to Expatriate American Citizens, 53
GEO. L.J. 315 (1965); Klubock, Expatriation - Its Origin and Meaning, 38 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 1 (1962); Roche, The Loss of American Nationality - The Development of Statutory
Expatriation, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 25 (1950); Note, Terrazas v. Vance and the Standard of
Proof in Expatriation Proceedings: Resolving the Ambiguity of Voluntariness, 65 VA. L.
REV. 713 (1979).
Deportation, a separate administrative procedure which is not governed by the
Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 404, 60 Stat. 237-44 (codified in
scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.), see Comment, Deportation and Exclusion: A Continuing
Dialgoue Between Congress and the Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 760, 769-80 (1962), results in
removal of an alien, see note 35 infra, from United States soil. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227,
1981]
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al intent of section 340. Accordingly, the courts have held' 9 that the
denaturalization proceeding is a suit in equity,20 governed by the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 2 1 and with a burden of proof on the Government of clear,
unequivocal, and convincing evidence.
22
Despite this civil facade, there are elements of criminal proceedings evident
in denaturalization suits. For example, the criminal past of defendants in many
denaturalization suits is vital to the Government's proof of an immigration law
violation. The Government must prove that the defendant lied about having an
unblemished criminal record and that, as a result, the defendant obtained his
American citizenship because of this misrepresentation. By proving that the
defendant lied, the Government, in effect, must prove that the defendant
committed the crime about which he lied. But the Supreme Court has stated
that the Government is not proving crimes in this situation because the
defendant is not subject to penal sanctions; instead, proof of the crime results in
denaturalization. 23 Denaturalization, then, is technically not a punishment -
1251-1254 (1976). See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.4 (1953) (defining
"exclusion," "expulsion," and "deportation"). Because denaturalization merely divests a
naturalized American of citizenship, a deportation hearing is necessary before the
denaturalized person or resident alien is forced to leave the United States. Thus,
deportations are much more prevalent than denaturalizations. See generally Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893);
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT, supra note 6, at 1709-33; IA
GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 16, at §§ 4.1-4.22, §§ 5.1-5.21; id. at vol. 2, §§ 7.1-7.12,
§§ 8.1-8.19; Developments in the Law, Immigration and Nationality, 66 HARV. L. REV.
643, 680-703 (1953).
The related areas of expatriation and deportation are instructive in analyzing
trends in denaturalization procedure because congressional and judicial activity in these
areas usually are of great predictive value in denaturalization cases. A more critical
analysis is required, however, before broad generalizations can be made because the
relationship between the Justice Department, Congress, and the courts is constitutionally
different in each of the three areas. See text accompanying notes 174 to 238 infra.
19. A clear majority in a Supreme Court opinion involving immigration law has been
the exception rather than the rule; splintered majorities and plurality opinions abound.
Consequently, many decisions are not binding in the traditional sense that one may feel
confident that the law in a particular area is secure from alteration in the immediate
future. See, e.g., Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943) (Justice Murphy,
apparently joined by Justices Black and Reed, writing the plurality opinion; Justices
Douglas and Rutledge writing separate concurrences; Chief Justice Stone, joined by
Justices Roberts and Frankfurter, writing the dissent; Justice Jackson not participating)
(Justice Murphy assumed that the naturalization decree was subject to de novo review in
any denaturalization proceeding, id. at 124, a finding upon which the authors of the
remaining opinions were bitterly divided.); Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 657
(1946) (All but two participating Justices upheld the five-man majority statement that de
novo review of the naturalization decree applied to all denaturalization cases).
20. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 239 )1912); see Note, Denaturaliza-
tion and the Right to Jury Trial, 71 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOIGO(;Y 46 )1980).
21. United States v. Minerich, 250 F.2d 721, 726 (7th Cir. 1975); 3 GoDOoN &
ROSENFIELD, supra note 16, at § 20.5a.
22. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 )1943) (plurality opinion).
23. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 98-99 (1958) (plurality opinion) (dictum).
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or at least not the punishment24 - which would be meted out to the defendant if
he, indeed, would be on trial for a criminal charge directed to the same acts.25
24. Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 616-19, modified, 336 U.S. 942 (1949)
(Rutledge, J., concurring); Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 675-79 (1946)
(Rutledge, Murphy, J.J., dissenting). Aside from the inspiring contributions from Justice
Rutledge, only lip-service has been paid to the severity of the sanctions on the
denaturalized individual. This is somewhat astonishing in view of the fact that the courts
and commentators have been embroiled in a controversy about whether the sanction of
deportation legally should be recognized as a punishment. For sources arguing that
deportation is a punishment, see Bullitt, Deportation as a Denial of Substantive Due
Process, 28 WASH. L. REV. 205 (1953); Fragomen, Procedural Aspects of Illegal Search and
Seizure in Deportation Cases, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 151, 156, 158 (1976); Legomsky, The
Alien Criminal Defendant: Sentencing Considerations, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 105, 120-21
(1977); Mancini, Deportation as Cruel and Unusual Punishment After Furman v. Georgia,
3 U. SAN FERNANDO VALLEY L. REV. 27 (1974); Maslow, Recasting Our Deportation Law:
Proposals for Reform, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 309 (1956); Navasky, Deportation as Punishment,
27 U. KAN. CITY L. REV. 213 (1959); Note, Deportation as Punishment: Plenary Power
Re-Examined, 52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 466, 480-84 (1975); Comment, Deportation and the
Right to Counsel, 11 HARV. INT'L L.J. 177, 185 (1970); Note, Immigrants, Aliens, and the
Constitution, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW. 1075, 1095 (1974); Note, Resident Aliens and Due
Process: Anatomy of a Deportation, 8 VILL. L. REV. 566, 576-85 (1963); 9 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 179, 181 (1976). But see Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966) ("To be
sure, a deportation proceeding is not a criminal prosecution."); Flemming v. Nestor, 363
U.S. 603, 616 (1960) ("[Dleportation has been held to be not punishment, but an exercise of
the plenary power of Congress."); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594 (1952) ("It
always has been considered that that which it [the Act] forbids is penal legislation which
imposes or increases criminal punishment.. . . Deportation, however severe its consequ-
ences, has been consistently classified as a civil rather than a criminal procedure. Both of
these doctrines as original proposals might be debatable, but both have been considered
closed for many years and a body of statute and decisional law has been built upon them."
(footnotes omitted)); Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 147 (1945) ("deportation technically
is not criminal punishment."); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913) ("The
determination by facts that might constitute a crime under local law is not a conviction of
crime, nor is the deportation a punishment; it is simply a refusal by the Government to
harbor persons whom it does not want.").
In part, the conclusion that deportation is punishment is based on the attempt to
equate deportation to banishment, a punishment no longer imposed in America. See In re
Yung Sing Hee, 36 F. 437, 439-40 (D. Or. 1888); U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE
TARNISHED GOLDEN DOOR: CIVIL RIGHTS ISSUES IN IMMIGRATION 96-101 (1980). See generally
Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 321 (1866); Armstrong, Banishment: Cruel
and Unusual Punishment, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 758 (1963). The Supreme Court has also
discussed deportation as a form of banishment on rare occasions. See, e.g., Boutilier v. INS,
387 U.S. 118,132 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 333 U.S. 6, 10
(1948); Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947).
25. At one time, illegal attainment of naturalized citizenship did constitute a crime.
The imposed punishment, however, was merely akin to that prescribed for a misdemeanor.
See Pre-Statutory Denaturalization, supra note 18, at 129-32. For an analysis of factors
considered when the Court assumes the power to declare a statute penal, see Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 95-99 (1958) (plurality opinion).
One of the themes of this comment is that through the guise of civil law, Congress
is able to prescribe an unusual sanction which it could not prescribe if section 340 was a
criminal statute. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) ("[Ulse of denaturalization as
a punishment is barred by the eighth amendment."); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. This theme,
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Still, the defendant in a denaturalization suit risks a loss of liberty comparable
to that of a defendant accused of a violent crime, but is granted virtually none of
the corresponding procedural safeguards afforded to criminal defendants by the
United States Constitution.2" Thus, the courts have had to stretch27 the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure to adequately protect the defendant in a denaturaliza-
tion suit who ultimately is subject to a deportation decree which could render
him stateless.2' These Rules, however, have not proved sufficiently resilient for
application in denaturalization proceedings, nor have the courts been inclined to
give the Rules a more liberal interpretation.
29
Whether denaturalization is considered a civil proceeding, a criminal
proceeding, or something in between is a determination crucial to arriving at a
formula of due process which will pass fifth amendment tests.3 ° As a preface to
the constitutional scrutiny, this comment will interpret the denaturalization
statute, will discuss the formulation of denaturalization procedure by the
Supreme Court, and will analyze the adequacy of the formulated procedures as
however, does not lead necessarily to the predictable, but mechanical, conclusion that
section 340 should be re-drafted as a criminal statute. See text accompanying notes 174 to
238 infra.
26. See Statutory Denaturalization, supra note 18, at 313.
27. See, e.g., Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 615 (FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
amendment of 1949 construed liberally), modified, 336 U.S. 942 (1949).
28. For a description of the burdens imposed on the expatriate, (or denaturalized
person), see Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958), overruled, Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S.
253 (1967) (expatriation case), where, in a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Warren said:
Remove this priceless possession [citizenship] and there remains a stateless person,
disgraced and degraded in the eyes of his countrymen. He has no lawful claim to
protection from any nation, and no nation may assert rights on his behalf. His very
existence is at the sufferance of the state within whose borders he happens to be.
Id. at 64. This drastic picture may be somewhat discounted in individual cases where the
defendant has a "dual citizenship" status. Cf. Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Since we accept dual citizenship,
taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign government is not necessarily inconsistent with
an intent to remain an American citizen." Id. at 272). But cf. Savorgnan v. United States,
338 U.S. 491, 500 (1950) (past efforts of Congress to discourage the acquisition of dual
citizenship).
29. See, e.g., Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 205 (1950) (Black, J.,
dissenting) ("It does no good to have liberalizing rules like 60(b) if, after they are written,
their arteries are hardened by this Court's resort to ancient common-law concepts."). See
notes 115 to 120 and accompanying text infra.
30. The fifth amendment provides that "[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law .. " U.S. CONST. amend. V. It applies to
persons in denaturalization proceedings because the denaturalization statute is a federal
law. Although the fourteenth amendment's due process clause by its language applies only
to state judicial procedures, the citizenship clause within the fourteenth amendment,
however, is applicable in either state or federal judicial proceedings, and is an essential
part of the analysis in this comment. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; text accompanying
notes 174 to 238 infra.
In addition, the Supreme Court has read the equal protection language of the
fourteenth amendment into the due process clause of the fifth amendment and applied
equal protection considerations to federal matters involving aliens. See Hampton v. Mow
Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976).
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applied in the current war criminal cases. This study will reveal that the
Supreme Court adheres to a strict practice of separating civil and criminal
procedures 3 1 in immigration affairs. This procedural method may conform with
tradition, but it raises questions as a constitutionally principled approach in the
value-laden field of citizenship law.
AMBIGUITIES IN THE STATUTE
Today, both naturalization and denaturalization are governed by statute.
32
Congress derives the implied power to denaturalize from its express power set
forth in the Constitution "to establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization." 33 The
31. Cf. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970):
We made clear in [In re Gault] that civil labels and good intentions do not themselves
obviate the need for criminal due process safeguards in juvenile courts, for "[a]
proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be 'delinquent' and
subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony
prosecution."
Id. at 365-66 (quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 6 (1967)).
32. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1459 (1976). The statutory era of denaturalization can be traced
to 1906. Nineteenth century denaturalization procedure differed from administration of
statutory denaturalization in significant ways. For example, pre-1906 cases could be
instituted in state as well as federal court. Additionally, prior to 1906, the naturalization
decree was vulnerable to collateral as well as direct attack. Further, in certain periods of
pre-1906 history, a naturalized citizen could be subject to the criminal penalty of
denaturalization if he were found in violation of a statute unrelated to the control of
immigration policy. See generally Pre-Statutory Denaturalization, supra note 18.
Under statutory denaturalization, suits may only be brought in federal court and
solely by the direct attack of a United States Attorney. Additionally, the defendant in such
a suit is vulnerable to a civil, not criminal, penalty. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1976). United
States v. Johannessen, 225 U.S. 227 (1912).
It is noteworthy that the pre-1906 cases were suits in equity. See Burke,
Interpretative Results of Wartime Denaturalization Proceedings, 18 S. CAL. L. REv. 110, 112
& n.51 (1944). In United States v. Norsch, 42 F. 417 (E.D. Mo. 1890), Judge Thayer
explained that the denaturalization suit was properly in equity because evidence of fraud
was presumed to vitiate a prior grant of any right. Judge Thayer arrived at this conclusion
by comparing the grant of citizenship to the grant of a patent. Id. at 417. See generally
Pre-Statutory Denaturalization, supra note 18; text accompanying notes 72 to 79 infra.
33. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 4. This implication follows either from congressional
power to establish naturalization procedures, id., because the power to naturalize
necessarily implies the power to denaturalize, or by means of the "necessary and proper"
clause. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18. But see Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946),
where, in a dissenting opinion, Justice Rutledge maintained:
In my opinion the power to naturalize is not the power to denaturalize. The act of
admission [of the alien into citizenship] must be taken as final ....
If this means that some or even many disloyal foreign-born citizens cannot be
deported, it is better so than to place so many loyal ones in inferior status. And there
are other effective methods for dealing with those who are disloyal, just as there are
for such citizens by birth.
Id. at 678-79 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). See generally Hertz, Limits to the Naturalization
Power, 64 GEO. L.J. 1007 (1976); Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Power of Congress
to Confer Citizenship by Naturalization, 50 IOWA L. REV. 1093 (1965); Note, Constitutional
Limitations on the Naturalization Power, 80 YALE L.J. 769 (1971).
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denaturalization statute operates to strip a naturalized34 American of his
citizenship. Once denaturalized, the person is an alien3 5 in the eyes of the law
and is considered never to have been a citizen. 36 In addition, as an alien the
person is vulnerable to deportation proceedings, 37 and in the specific case of a
denaturalized war criminal, the alien is subject to extradition if a foreign
government lawfully requests that he be sent abroad to be tried for war
crimes.
38
34. See note 16 supra.
35. "The term 'alien' means any person not a citizen or national of the United States."
8 U.S.C. § 1101(3) (1976). Aliens, like citizens, are protected by those sections of the Bill of
Rights referring to "persons." Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586 n.9 (1952)
(aliens must be accorded the protections of the fifth and sixth amendments); Fong Yue
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1893); Haitian Refugee Center v. Civiletti, 503
F. Supp. 442, 452 (S.D. Fla. 1980). Once lawfully in the United States, aliens are required
to obey applicable federal and state laws, and if they fail to do so, they may be held liable
and punished. Radich v. Hutchins, 95 U.S. 210 (1877); J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF PEACE 299 (6th ed. 1963). See L. HENKIN,
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 252 (1972). See generally 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD,
supra note 16, at §§ 1.30-1.46; Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully Admitted
Permanent Resident Alien: The Inherent Limits of the Power to Expel, 69 YALE L.J. 262
(1959); Hesse, The Constitutional Status of the Lawfully Admitted Permanent Resident
Alien: The Pre-1917 Cases, 68 YALE L.J. 1578 (1959); Powers, Treason by Domiciled
Aliens, 17 MIL. L. REV. 123 (1962).
Aliens, however, differ from citizens in several important respects. For example,
aliens seeking initial admission to the United States possess no constitutional right to
enter. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279
(1904). In addition, once lawfully admitted, aliens can be subjected to extensive regulation
or even deportation after a hearing which must comport with due process requirements.
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 586-87 (1952); Haitian Refugee Center v.
Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 452 (S.D. Fla. 1980). See, e.g., Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745
(D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980) (relying on Harisiades to uphold
regulations placed solely on Iranian aliens against equal protection scrutiny). See
generally Comment, Foreign Affairs Cases: The Need for a Mandatory Certification
Procedure, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 1186, 1193-97 (1980). Most significantly, however, aliens
differ from citizens because only citizens have the right to vote. See Rosberg, Aliens and
Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote? 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092, 1132-36 (1977).
36. See Statutory Denaturalization, supra note 18, at 325:
Based on legal sophistry, the position that a denaturalized person has never been a
citizen is thoroughly untenable as a practical proposition. "To make what has been
done as though it had never been" is, according to the Greek poet, "the one power
denied to God." But it is not a power denied to the United States courts in
denaturalization cases.
This void ab initio theory has been erratically applied to denaturalization procedure. See
generally Note, Revocation of Citizenship and The Void Ab Initio Concept, 50 COLUM. L.
REV. 674 (1950).
37. See generally 1 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 16, at § 4.1-22, 5.1-.21; id. at
vol. 2, §§ 7.1-.12, 8.1-.19; notes 18 & 35 supra.
38. 18 U.S.C. §3184 (1976). The Supreme Court has defined extradition as "the
surrender by one nation to another of an individual accused or convicted of an offense
outside of its own territory, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the other, which,
being competent to try and to punish him, demands the surrender." Terlinden v. Ames,
184 U.S. 270, 289 (1902). The United States Government will agree to extradite the
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Naturalization, governed by statute more extensively than denaturaliza-
tion, is conferred on an eligible alien who desires the benefits and obligations of
American citizenship, but who does not enjoy the birthright of that status
because he was born abroad to non-American parents. 39 As early as 1824, Chief
Justice Marshall stated, in dictum, that the naturalized citizen is "distinguish-
subject alien only if there is a valid extradition treaty between the requesting government
and the United States. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (1976) (listing the treaties currently in force). The
burden of proof on the Government in an extradition proceeding is measured by a probable
cause standard. See In re Ryan, 360 F. Supp. 270, 273 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 478 F.2d 1397 (2d
Cir. 1973).
Under the terms of most of its extradition treaties, the Government, at its
discretion, see Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933), may decide not to
surrender the "fugitive" if it determines that the crime with which the alien is accused is a
"political offense." See, e.g., Treaty for the Mutual Extradition of Fugitives From Justice,
Oct. 25, 1901, United States - Servia, art. VI, 32 Stat. 189, T.S. No. 406. The immigration
statutes and the language of these treaties, however, do not define what constitutes a
political offense. Note, Political Asylum in the United States: A Failure of Human Rights
Policy, 9 RUT.-CAM. L.J. 133, 143 (1977). At least one circuit court has held that the
alleged crime must have been part of an organized political activity to come under the
asylum-granting exception. Compare Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198, 203 (9th Cir.
1957), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 355 U.S. 393 (1958) (On remand, United
States v. Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959), the California District Court
refused to surrender the defendant to the communist state of Yugoslavia because the
alleged war crimes constituted a "political offense" exception.) with In re Ryan, 360 F.
Supp. 270, 272-73 n.4 (E.D.N.Y.) affd, 478 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1973) (New York District
Court surrendered the alleged war criminal to the non-communist state of West Germany,
holding that war crimes were not "political offenses"); Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No.
96-212, § 203(e), 94 Stat. 107 (1980) (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) such that the "political
offense" exception is inapplicable if the "alien ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise
participated in the persecution of any person on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."). It is not believed that any
language differences in the individual treaties adequately explains the different results
emanating from the two cases compared above. Rather, it is believed that the changing
web of American domestic and foreign policy accounts for one result in 1959 and a
different one in 1973. See also Ivancevic v. Artukovic, 211 F.2d 565, 575 (9th Cir. 1954)
(the applicability of the Yugoslavian extradition treaty upheld despite the fact that
Serbia, not Yugoslavia, was the original treaty-signing state). See generally In re Eain, 48
U.S.L.W. 2449 (N.D. Ill., Dec. 18, 1979) (offenses charged to a member of the Palestine
Liberation Organization did not fall under the political offense exception; hence, defendant
was extradited to Israel); Garcia-Mora, The Present Status of Political Offenses in the Law
of Extradition and Asylum, 14 U. Pirr. L. REV. 371 (1953); Green, Political Offences, War
Crimes and Extradition, 11 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 329 (1962); Comment, Non-Extradition for
Political Offenses: The Communist Perspective, 11 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191 (1970); Note,
Political Asylum in the United States: A Failure of Human Rights Policy, 9 RUT.-CAM. L.J.
133 (1977).
39. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1459 (1976). Unless a special exception applies, see 3 GORDON &
ROSENFIELD, supra note 16, at § 18.1-.7, naturalization can only be acquired in accordance
with the formal requirements of section 316 of the Act. The judge issuing a naturalization
decree must remain steadfast to the letter of the law set in section 316. The practical
result is that the principles of equity which conflict with the strict application of the




able in nothing from a native citizen, except so far as the Constitution makes the
distinction."4 Almost a half century later, the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution was enacted, mirroring the sentiments of the former Chief Justice
by declaring that persons born or naturalized in the United States are
"citizens."41 Excepting the requirement that the President and the Vice-
President of the United States be native-born,42 the language of the Constitu-
tion purportedly treats naturalized and native-born citizens alike. While
equality is a venerable ideal according to Marshall in Osborn v. Bank of United
States,4 3 a chief criticism of the denaturalization procedure is that it is rooted in
the virtual presumption that naturalized Americans are "second-class
citizens."
44
To understand the basis of this criticism, the elements of naturalization and
denaturalization procedure must be examined. The starting point is section
316(a) of the Act which sets forth the basic conditions precedent for
naturalization.45 The first set of conditions under this section requires that the
petitioner for naturalization establish residence in the United States for a
period of five years immediately preceding his petition 46 - an objective fact
easily ascertainable.47 In addition, the applicant must satisfy various subjective
criteria. He must be "of good moral character, attached to the principles of the
Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good order and
happiness of the United States"48 - abstract beliefs not so simply determinable.
40. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 827-28 (1824).
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. In an early interpretation of the fourteenth
amendment, the Supreme Court decided that the citizenship clause should not be viewed
as imposing undue restrictions on citizenship. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649,
687-88(1898).
42. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1; id. at amend. XII.
43. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
44. Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 169 (1964) (dictum); Knauer v. United States,
328 U.S. 654, 676 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting). In Schneiderman v. United States, 320
U.S. 118 (1943), Justice Rutledge argued, in a concurring opinion, that:
[The naturalization] judgment might be affirmed on appeal and again on certiorari
here. Yet the day after, or ten years later, any district judge could overthrow it, on the
same evidence, if it was conflicting or gave room for contrary inferences. . . . If this is
the law and the right the naturalized citizen acquires, his admission creates nothing
more than citizenship in attenuated, if not suspended, animation.
Id. at 166. See Countryman, Justice Douglas and American Citizenship, 15 GONZAGA L.
REV. 957, 975 (1980); Statutory Denaturalization, supra note 18, at 313; Comment, The
Alien and the Constitution, 20 U. CH. L. REV. 547, 560-61 (1953). But see Knauer v.
United States, 328 U.S. 654, 658 (1946) ("Citizenship obtained through naturalization is
not second-class citizenship.").
45. 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (1976).
46. Id. at § 1427(a). In addition, § 1427(a)(2) requires that the applicant reside
continuously in the United States from the time of the filing of the petition until the grant
of citizenship.
47. Contra, Statutory Denaturalization, supra note 18, at 308.
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3) (1976).
[VOL. 40
DENATURALIZATION OF NAZI WAR CRIMINALS
When the Government wishes to institute denaturalization proceedings
against a naturalized citizen, section 340(a) of the Act states that a United
States Attorney - and he alone - may institute a denaturalization suit by
filing an affidavit of good cause in the federal district court for the judicial
district in which the defendant resides.49 Section 340(a) further provides that
the Government may base its claim either on the ground that the individual
"illegally procured" his naturalization, or on the ground that he attained this
status by "concealment of a material fact" or by "willful misrepresentation."5
These terms are not defined in the statute; thus, it has been left to the courts to
resolve their ambiguities.
49. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1976). The procedure in section 340 and predecessor statutes,
see note 18 supra, is considered a "self-contained, exclusive procedure." Bindczyck v.
Finucane, 342 U.S. 76, 83 (1951). For example, the Court has been compelled to
specifically enforce the filing requirement of the good cause affidavit. United States v.
Zucca, 351 U.S. 91, 99 (1956). Contra, id. at 104 (Clark, J., dissenting) ("[T]his [holding]
clearly frustrates an important congressional program, a part of the broader one designed
to protect our country from Communist infiltration.").
In addition, the rationale for limiting standing to file suit to U.S. Attorneys has
been to ensure the security of naturalized citizens from collateral attack by persons who
might have a personal grievance to vent against the naturalized citizen. See, e.g.,
Soobzokov v. CBS, Inc., No. 78-CIV-4908 (S.D.N.Y., filed Oct. 18, 1978) (pending libel
action by an alleged war ciminal against the author of WANTED: THE SEARCH FOR
NAZis IN AMERICA (1977)); Pre-Statutory Denaturalization, supra note 18, at 124-25 &
n.21. That is, the suit brought by the U.S. Attorney is considered a direct attack on the
naturalization judgment. Grahl v. United States, 261 F. 487, 490 (7th Cir. 1919); United
States v. Dolla, 177 F. 101, 105 (5th Cir. 1910).
50. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1976). For purposes of clarity, use of the term "misrepresenta-
tion" will include both the statutory terms "concealment of a material fact" and "willful
misrepresentation." See Fedorenko v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 737, 748 n.28 (1981)
("Although the denaturalization statute speaks in terms of 'willful misrepresentation' or
'concealment of a material fact,' this Court has indicated that the concealment, no less
than the misrepresentation, must be willful and the misrepresentation must also relate to
a material fact.") (citing Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 271-72 n.3 (1961)).
Under the original, 1906 version of the statute, Act of June 29, 1906, Pub. L. No.
59-338, § 15, 34 Stat. 601, as well as its 1940 successor, Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L.
No. 76-853, § 338, 54 Stat. 1158, the grounds for denaturalization could be based on either
"fraud" or "illegal procurement." The "fraud" ground proved to be a problem for those
courts interpreting the predecessor statutes because of the Supreme Court's holding in
Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912), that statutory denaturalization
proceedings are suits in equity. See text accompanying notes 72 to 79 infra. Traditionally,
equity courts would only hear evidence of "extrinsic" fraud (i.e., collateral evidence) to
nullify a prior grant, whereas evidence of "intrinsic" fraud (i.e., false swearing during the
naturalization proceeding) was of no probative value for the purpose of revocation in
denaturalization suits. See Burke, Interpretative Results of Wartime Denaturalization
Proceedings, 18 S. CAL. L. REV. 110, 112 (1944); text accompanying note 80 infra. But see
United States v. Albertini, 206 F. 133 (D. Mont. 1913).
This distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud was rejected by some lower
courts in denaturalization suits. See, e.g., United States v. Hauck, 155 F.2d 141 (2d Cir.
1946); United States v. Siegel, 152 F.2d 614, 615 (2d Cir. 1945). Congress adopted this
latter common-law adjustment when it enacted the replacement language, "concealment
of a material fact" and "willful misrepresentation" as the fraud-based ground in section
1981]
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The Government may bring a suit on illegal procurement grounds if the
applicant for naturalization failed to comply with one of the conditions
precedent of the naturalization statute. Theoretically, an illegal procurement
case can also be brought on misrepresentation grounds if the Government can
prove that the applicant intended not to fulfill the particular condition
precedent at issue. Thus, misrepresentation cases essentially are a subset of
illegal procurement cases. Historically, however, suits which conceivably have
encompassed both grounds have often resulted in decisions based on only one of
the two grounds.
5 1
During the first fifty years of statutory denaturalization, for example, the
Government attempted to denaturalize citizens because of membership in the
Communist Party or other organizations which espoused doctrines considered
antithetical to American allegiance. These suits were brought on the ground of
illegal procurement for failure to comply with the condition precedent of
340 of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1976). See Costello v.
United States, 365 U.S. 265, 271-72 n.3 (1961). However, these new, undefined terms
created further problems as the courts struggled to determine their meaning, especially as
to what constituted materiality. See notes 58 & 61 and accompanying text infra. In
addition, when Congress enacted section 340 in the 1952 Act, it deleted "illegal
procurement" as a ground for denaturalization. This imposed an even heavier burden on
the Government because the effect of the deletion was that deficiencies in the
naturalization petition and proceeding would only constitute grounds for denaturalization
if the petitioner intentionally or knowingly violated the conditions precedent for
naturalization. Prior to the deletion, the Government could avoid having to prove difficult
issues of intent by bringing suit based on illegal procurement grounds. See LEG-
ISLATIVE HISTORY OF IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT, supra note 6, at 1741; Burke,
Interpretative Results of Wartime Denaturalization Proceedings, 18 S. CAL. L. REV. 110,
115-16 (1944) (only two denaturalization cases had been instituted solely on the ground of
fraud); Developments in the Law, Immigration and Nationality, 66 HARV. L. REV. 643, 717,
720 (1953).
But, in 1961, Congress amended section 340 to include once again the ground of
"illegal procurement." Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 18, 75 Stat. 656. This
amendment apparently was an expression of congressional disdain at the Supreme Court's
imposition in 1943 of a heavy burden of proof on the Government in denaturalization
cases:
Proof of concealment of material facts or willfull misrepresentation (fraud) in a
denaturalization case is fraught with difficulty. Although the proceeding is civil, not
criminal, the Government must prove its case by "clear, convincing, and unequivocal"
evidence. . . . [Ilt is difficult if not impossible to prove [these intentional acts]. Thus,
in the absence of such proof, there have been rendered ineffectual important sections of
the naturalization laws which spell out absolute bars to the naturalization of aliens who
are engaged in, or are members of, or affiliated with subversive organizations and
activities during prescribed periods of time preceding their naturalization.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE ACT OF SEPT. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 18, 75 Stat. 656,
reprinted in [1961] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2950, 2982-83 (emphasis added). See
text accompanying notes 87 to 95 infra.
51. See, e.g., Fedorenko v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 737 (1981) (holding limited solely
to illegal procurement grounds); Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960) (holding
based primarily on misrepresentation grounds).
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"attachment. ' 2 Section 340(c) states that for the first five years as a citizen, a
naturalized American cannot become affiliated with an organization if mem-
bership in that organization would have precluded attainment of United States
citizenship at the time of his petition for naturalization.5 3 According to the
statutory provision, which is still in effect today,5 4 affiliation in a black-listed
organization after naturalization is "prima facie" evidence of lack of attachment
prior to naturalization. In retrospect, the attachment suits decided solely on
illegal procurement grounds could also have been instituted and decided on the
ground of misrepresentation if the defendant lied, when asked, about mem-
bership in subversive organizations.
Recently, the war criminal cases55 have upstaged the prevalence and drama
of these attachment suits. Falsification or concealment of objective facts about
one's past - or misrepresentation - is the central issue in the war criminal
cases. The courts have been unanimous since 1960 that the alleged misrepre-
sentations must be "material" to whether the citizen could have attained
citizenship if the true facts of his past had been fully disclosed.56 The courts,
however, did not apply a uniform standard to determine the meaning of
"material" misrepresentation. Because of the Supreme Court's decision in
Chaunt v. United States,57 the circuit courts are split as to whether a
misrepresentation is sufficiently material if: (1) the truth would have provided
leads for uncovering the "smoking gun," effectively precluding the grant of
naturalization; or (2) the truth alone - without the need for further
52. See, e.g., Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943) (plurality opinion).
Cf. Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, 79 (1961)
(leaving open the question whether membership in the Communist Party would constitute
grounds for denaturalization). See generally Note, Cancellation of Citizenship Because of
Communism, 51 YALE L.J. 1215 (1942).
The first targets of attachment suits were allegedly disloyal German-Americans
and Italian-Americans. See Balch, Denaturalization Based on Disloyalty and Disbelief in
Constitutional Principles, 29 MINN. L. REV. 405, 405, 427-34 (1945); Black, Disloyalty and
Denaturalization, 29 Ky. L.J. 143, 160-62 (1941); Burke, Interpretative Results of Wartime
Denaturalization Proceedings, 18 S. CAL. L. REV. 110, 111-12 (1941).
53. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c) (1976).
54. The Supreme Court has extensively criticized this provision. See, e.g., Nowak v.
United States, 356 U.S. 660 (1958); Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946);
Baumgartner v. United States, 332 U.S. 665 (1944); Schneiderman v. United States, 320
U.S. 118 (1943). See also Statutory Denaturalization, supra note 18, at 327. See generally
notes 49 & 50 supra.
55. To date, twenty-five war criminal suits have been instituted, including
denaturalizations, deportations, and extraditions. See notes 133 to 140 and accompanying
text infra; ADDENDUM following note 249.
56. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350 (1960). Prior to 1960, there were only
isolated cases holding materiality to be a requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Rovin, 12
F.2d 942, 944 (E.D. Mich. 1926).
57. 364 U.S. 350 (1960). See note 58 infra.
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investigation - would have been sufficient to bar the granting of citizenship.58
In the first war criminal denaturalization suit to reach the Supreme Court,
Fedorenko v. United States,5 9 the Court was provided with an excellent
opportunity to clarify this distinction, but the majority declined to base its
holding upon the confusion over interpretation of Chaunt.60 A precise deter-
58. In Chaunt, the Supreme Court held that a misrepresentation was material if the
Government showed by the requisite burden of proof evidence either: "1) that facts were
suppressed which, if known, would have warranted denial of citizenship or 2) that their
disclosure might have been useful in an investigation possibly leading to the discovery of
other facts warranting denial of citizenship." 364 U.S. at 355 (emphasis added). The
disagreement among the circuit courts is vividly demonstrated by comparing the coverage
of this issue in the Florida District Court opinion in United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F.
Supp. 893 (S.D. Fla. 1978), with the opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), aft'd on other grounds, 101 S. Ct. 737 (1981). In the district
court, the trial judge held that the term "possibly" in the above-quoted passage from
Chaunt modified the phrase, "leading to the discovery of other facts." 455 F. Supp. at 915.
See La Madrid-Peraza v. INS, 492 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Riela, 337
F.2d 986 (3d Cir. 1964); United States v. Rossi, 299 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1962). If this is the
correct interpretation, then the Government would have to prove that the omitted fact
would - by itself - have resulted in a denial of citizenship if the fact had been revealed
to the immigration officials. 455 F. Supp. at 914-16.
The Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court on this issue by stating that the
district court had "destroyed the utility" of the second prong of the Chaunt test for
materiality. Citing the Second Circuit's opinion in United States v. Oddo, 314 F.2d 115 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 833 (1963), Judge Wisdom, writing for the court, held that
"possibly" modified the full phrase, "leading to the discovery of other facts warranting
denial of citizenship." Thus, the Government only would have to show that the omitted
fact might have resulted in a denial of citizenship if the fact had been revealed to INS
officials at the outset. 597 F.2d at 949. Accord, Corrado v. United States, 227 F.2d 780, 784
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 925 (1956). See also Langhammer v. Hamilton, 295 F.2d
642, 648 (1st Cir. 1961). On review before the Supreme Court, Fedorenko v. United States,
101 S. Ct. 737 (1981), however, the majority held that the Chaunt test for materiality was
inapplicable to the facts of this particular case. Id. at 748-52. Thus, the issue is still
unresolved. Cf. id. at 757 & n. 13. (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("I must join the Court in not
accepting the reasoning of the Court of Appeals, which would have diluted the materiality
standard.").
59. 101 S. Ct. 737 (1981).
60. Id. at 748-52 ("Our decision makes it unnecessary to resolve the question
whether the [Fifth Circuit] Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the materiality test
enunciated in Chaunt." Id. at 753 n.40). Cf. id. at 753 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("I am
perplexed . . . by the Court's reluctance . . . to apply the materiality standard of Chaunt
... to petitioner's circumstances."). The majority in Fedorenko determined that the
materiality rule of Chaunt was inapplicable because Chaunt covered misrepresentations
in the naturalization stage after initial legal entry had occurred. The facts in Fedorenko
applied to misrepresentations at the visa stage, not at the time of application for
naturalization. In addition, because the Court concluded that the defendant had illegally
procured his citizenship in violation of § 2(a) of the Displaced Persons Act, see note 7
supra, Justice Marshall declined from deciding whether a misrepresentation at the visa
stage could be assumed to relate forward as equivalent to misrepresentations in the
naturalization stage. Id. at 748-52. Several circuit courts, including the Fifth Circuit
opinion in Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946, have assumed without question that the materiality
precedent in Chaunt also controls misrepresentations in the visa stage. See, e.g., United
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mination of the nature of the burden of proof in denaturalization based on the
materiality standard therefore is an issue which remains unresolved.6 In fact,
the Court in Fedorenko avoided the "materiality" conflict by deciding the war
criminal case solely on the ground of illegal procurement, thereby relieving the
Government of the burden of proving that Fedorenko intended to "materially"
misrepresent his war criminal past.62
Thus, the line separating an illegal procurement case from a misrepresenta-
tion suit is blurred in many denaturalization proceedings.6 3 Confusion prevails
in the administration of denaturalization procedure because the courts are
inconsistent in separating the two grounds.6 4 It follows that serious questions
should be raised about the precedential value of holdings which relate only to
one of the two types of denaturalization suits.
6 5
States v. Rossi, 299 F.2d 650 (9th Cir. 1962). There is an indication in the concurring
opinion of Justice Blackmun in Federenko, however, that this relation forward assumption
is appropriate and that precedents in misrepresentation suits apply to the facts in
Fedorenko. 101 S. Ct. at 754. See text accompanying notes 225 to 238 infra.
61. Contra, Fedorenko v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 737, 753-58 (1981) (Blackmum, J.,
concurring) (under either of the two tests in Chaunt the Government must prove that the
misrepresentations, alone, would have resulted in a denial of citizenship); id. at 763
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. See note 60 supra; text accompanying notes 225 to 238 infra.
63. See text accompanying note 50 supra. The only situation in which the two
grounds do not overlap is when the defendant is unaware of a deficiency in his
naturalization process. In such a case of innocent mistake, only an illegal procurement
suit may be brought by the Government. See note 49 supra.
64. See, e.g., Fedorenko v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 737 (1981), where the Supreme
Court upheld the denaturalization of the petitioner solely on illegal procurement grounds
despite the fact that both the petitioner and the Government assumed that the facts
invoked precedents from misrepresentation cases. Id. at 752. See also Statutory
Denaturalization, supra note 18, at 308.
65. In an amazing feat of legal research, Judge Peirson M. Hall, formerly of the
Federal District Court in California, amassed, analyzed, and classified approximately 130
denaturalization cases into categories according to which condition precedent allegedly
had been violated in each case. He further broke each of these eight categories into six
subcategories specifying whether the suit was brought on grounds: a) amounting to fraud
and/or illegal procurement without distinction; b) amounting to fraud alone; c) amounting
to illegal procurement alone; d) not amounting to fraud; e) not amounting to illegal
procurement; or f) not amounting to fraud or illegal procurement. See United States v.
Kusche, 56 F. Supp. 201, 210-16 (S.D. Cal. 1944).
In laboring to compile the chart, Judge Hall noted:
A classification was . . . made by attempting to group the elements declared to be
either fraud or illegal procurement. But these classifications produced neither
reconciliation nor approximate uniformity with regard to any feature. . . . Nor could
any view be said to be 'supported by the weight of authority.'. . . In fact, almost any
conclusion which might be reached could be buttressed by an imposing array of
authorities. . . . But the gravity of the matters which press for decision, indeed the





It is not surprising, therefore, that judicial interpretation of the congres-
sional mandate has not always produced uniform results. In a concurring
opinion, Justice Douglas observed that doubts or ambiguities in the statute
should be resolved in favor of the defendant in the denaturalization suit: "[alt
least when two interpretations of the Naturalization Act are possible we should
choose the one which is the more hospitable to that ideal for which American
citizenship itself stands."66 Justice Douglas' observation reflects the holding by
the Supreme Court that a burden of proof of clear, unequivocal, and convincing
evidence rests on the Government in a denaturalization proceeding.6 7
In addition to the heavy burden of proof placed on the Government, the very
language of the statute seems to temper any threshhold concern that a
defendant will not receive due process. Section 340(a) requires that the United
States Attorney institute "proceedings," 68 which implies that if the defendant
timely answers the Government's complaint he will be heard. Further, section
340(b) provides that a defendant will receive sixty days notice prior to any
hearing.69 Thus, the twin procedural safeguards of notice and hearing7 are
written into the statute. Defendants argue that although these guarantees of
due process may be sufficient for a typical civil suit, they are too flimsy to
protect a defendant who faces the often disastrous results of a denaturalization
suit.
71
Attention to these statutory ambiguities provides only a first step towards
the mastery of the concepts in denaturalization procedure. In addition to
interpreting the express terms of the denaturalization statute, the Supreme
Court has developed its own body of law governing the application of the
denaturalization statute.
CONFUSION IN AND OUT OF THE COURTROOM
Soon after the commencement of statutory denaturalization in 1906, the
Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality of the statute and provided
judicial guidelines for its operation. In 1912, the Court decided Johannessen v.
66. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 165 (1943) (plurality opinion)
(Douglas, J., concurring). Contra, United States v. Manzi, 276 U.S. 463, 467 (1928)
(holding that doubts should be resolved in favor of the Government in a denaturalization
suit).
67. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943) (plurality opinion
finding that a clear, unequivocal, and convincing burden of proof rests with the
Government in an illegal procurement case); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665,
670 (1944) (holding that the burden of proof exacted in Schneiderman applied in all
denaturalization suits).
68. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1976).
69. Id. at § 1451(b).
70. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267-70 (1970); Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 143, 160-74 (1951).
71. See, e.g., Response to Plaintiff's Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment of
July 16, 1979, United States v. Trifa, No. 5-70924 (E.D. Mich., Sept. 4, 1980).
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United States,72 setting the precedent that statutory denaturalization is a civil
action in equity.7 3 Based on the 1906 version of the denaturalization statute, the
Government alleged that Johannessen obtained his citizenship illegally when
he lied about the length of time he had resided in the United States.
Johannessen attacked the validity of the statute, maintaining that his
naturalization judgment was res judicata 74 on any later inquiries by means of
the denaturalization procedures. Justice Pitney, writing for a unanimous Court,
acknowledged that naturalizations are conferred by courts of law, but denied
that they constituted final judgments merely because of this judicial character.
The Court pointed out that a naturalization proceeding was an ex parte setting
in which the Government need not be present.75 Thus, the Court dismissed the
defendant's res judicata argument without considering the real possibility that a
future denaturalization might attack a grant of American citizenship which had
flowed from an adversary naturalization proceeding.
76
Probing into the nature of the naturalization proceeding instead of the
nature of the proceeding which revokes that naturalization, the Court was
comfortable in comparing denaturalization to civil revocation for fraud in both
property and patent law:
Such a certificate, including the "judgment" upon which it is based, is in its
essence an instrument granting political privileges, and open like other
public grants to be revoked if and when it shall be found to have been
unlawfully or fraudulently procured. It is in this respect closely analogous
to a public grant of land. . . or of the exclusive right to make, use and vend
a new and useful invention .... 77
In this way, the Court declined to distinguish loss of an interest in a public
grant of land from loss of an interest in citizenship, the latter of which Justice
Brandeis later described as a loss of "all that makes life worth living."78 Thus,
72. 225 U.S. 227 (1912).
73. Pre-statutory denaturalization cases were also tried in equity courts, and,
therefore, were governed by rules of civil procedure. See generally Pre-Statutory
Denaturalization, supra note 18; note 32 supra.
74. 225 U.S. at 235. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n.5 (1979).
75. The petitioner for naturalization "is not required to make the Government a party
nor to give any notice to its representatives." 225 U.S. at 237.
76. "What may be the effect of a judgment allowing naturalization in a case where
the Government has appeared and litigated the matter does not now concern us." Id. See
also Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 124 (1943) (plurality opinion); United
States v. Ness, 245 U.S. 319 (1917); Statutory Denaturalization, supra note 18, at 281-87.
77. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 238 (1912).
78. Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922). In examining due process issues,
the danger in comparing denaturalization procedure with property revocation procedure is
that the precedents for the latter procedure are based on the common law, thus ignoring
the more compelling constitutional precedents of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
See, e.g., United States v. Bell Tel. Co., 128 U.S. 315, 361 (1888); cf. Luria v. United
States, 231 U.S. 9, 27 (1913) (denaturalization was not a suit at common law).
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the Court in Johannessen extended equity jurisdiction to citizenship revocation
cases to maintain consistency with property revocation proceedings, which were
in courts of equity. Requests for a jury trial by defendants in denaturalization
suits have been summarily denied precisely because of this analogy to property
law.7
9
According to the Court, the ex parte nature of the naturalization proceeding
also disposed of the petitioner's separation of powers argument. Johannessen
argued that the legislature could not enact a statute authorizing denaturaliza-
tion based on evidence of peijured testimony in the naturalization proceeding
(intrinsic fraud) because it was the province of the equity courts to revoke
previously granted rights only upon evidence of extrinsic fraud.8 0 The Court
reasoned that the statute should also apply when the allegation of fraud rested
on evidence intrinsic to the naturalization proceeding; otherwise, there would be
no means with which to challenge perjury on the witness stand because of the ex
parte nature of the naturalization proceeding.8 1 Hence, the Johannessen
decision implies that there would be no adequate safeguard to ensure absolute
compliance with the statutory conditions precedent to naturalization if the
legislature had not provided for this apparently novel form of judicial review.
The Court justified the legislative imposition of this form of judicial review,
however, in a rather conclusory manner: "Retrospective acts of this character
have often been held not to be an assumption by the legislative department of
judicial powers."8 2
The Court in Johannessen also thwarted the defendant's ex post facto attack
on the statute. The defendant contended that the statute was unconstitutional
because it applied to persons who became naturalized before its enactment.
Justice Pitney stated that the ex post facto clause in the Constitution related
only to those statutes imposing punishment. The Court emphasized that the
sanction of denaturalization did not constitute punishment: "[The Act] simply
deprives him of his ill-gotten privileges .... [It] makes nothing fraudulent or
unlawful - that was honest and lawful when it was done. It imposes no new
penalty upon the wrongdoer." 3 This early determination that denaturalization
is not punishment has prevented application of sixth and eighth amendment
79. Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 27-28 (1913); United States v. Walus, 453 F.
Supp. 699 (N.D. Ill. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 616 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1980). See 3
GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 16, at § 20.5d; Note, supra note 20, at 46.
80. See note 50 supra.
81. Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227, 241 (1912).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 242.
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rights8 4 and access to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure85 to defendants
in later denaturalization suits. Subsequent courts, in effect, have upheld the
spirit of Johannessen by denying the application of those two amendments as
well as the Federal Criminal Rules. The later cases state that these procedural
protections are available only to defendants who face punishment pursuant to a
criminal statute per se.
s6
Innovations in the framework of denaturalization procedure came about in
1943 with the wartime decision of Schneiderman v. United States.8 1 Under the
1906 version of the Act, the Government alleged that Schneiderman had not
been "attached" to the United States when he joined the Communist Party soon
after becoming a citizen. The opinion is most prominent for the finding that the
"attachment" requirement was not intended as a dragnet for all Communist
sympathizers,' but Schneiderman is also a landmark decision for procedural
reasons. This decision of the Court paved the way for infusions of greater
84. Both amendments have been construed to apply solely in criminal proceedings.
The sixth amendment, by its terms, is implicated only in criminal cases:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law,
and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. See generally Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 STAN. L. REV.
476, 494-95 n.131 (1968).
The eighth amendment, however, does not contain explicit language restricting
its application solely to criminal proceedings: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST.
amend. VIII. Thus, in Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), and in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), sections of the civil expatriation statute were held
unconstitutional because they violated the eighth amendment safeguard against "cruel
and unusual" punishment. There have been numerous instances when the Court has been
criticized for not extending this eighth amendment prohibition to other civil and
administrative situations, including denaturalization suits. See, e.g., Comment, Ingraham
v. Wright: Corporal Punishment in Schools Passes Constitutional Tests, 37 MD. L. REV.
594, 603-10 (1978).
85. See, e.g., Opinion and Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Reimbursement of
Travel Expenses of June 14, 1979, United States v. Trifa, No. 5-70924 (E.D. Mich., Sept.
4, 1980) (denial of defendant's request for access to FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(c)).
86. See, e.g., United States v. Trifa, No. 5-70924 (E.D. Mich., Sept. 4, 1980) (denial of
application of Criminal Rules); United States v. Walus, 453 F. Supp. 699, 716 (N.D. Ill.
1978) (denial of sixth amendment right to speedy trial). See generally Statutory
Denaturalization, supra note 18, at 279-80.
87. 320 U.S. 118 (1943) (plurality opinion).
88. The substantive ruling in Schneiderman transformed the proof needed in an
attachment suit from that of proving the defendant's subjective belief in subversion to that
of proving the defendant's overt acts toward the actual accomplishment of subversion:
There is a material difference between agitation and exhortation calling for present
violent action which creates a clear and present danger of public disorder or other
substantive evil, and mere doctrinal justification or prediction of the use of force
under hypothetical conditions at some indefinite future time - a prediction that is
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procedural safeguards to protect the civil rights of defendants by departing from
the previous employment of a preponderance of the evidence burden in
denaturalization proceedings. s9 Justice Murphy, author of the plurality opinion,
pronounced that the Government's burden of proof in a denaturalization suit
must be one of "clear, unequivocal, and convincing" evidence.
90
Justice Murphy technically confined the implementation of this stricter
burden to the "attachment" subcategory of illegal procurement cases: "If a
finding of attachment can be so reconsidered in a denaturalization suit, our
decisions make it plain that the Government needs more than a bare
preponderance of the evidence to prevail."91 In requiring the heavier standard of
proof, in a suit exclusively instituted on illegal procurement grounds, as in
Schneiderman, the Court conceivably could have been expressing outrage at the
notion that Congress had offered the Government generous means by which to
triumph in an attachment suit which does not include the ground of
misrepresentation. 92 If an attachment suit is brought on illegal procurement
and misrepresentation grounds, the Government would have the added burden
of proving that the defendant intended to violate the wholly abstract condition
precedent of attachment.93 If this interpretation is correct, this procedural
"holding" in Schneiderman should have been restricted to pure illegal procure-
ment suits because the requirement of proving intent in a misrepresentation
case could be construed as a safeguard sufficient to ensure that a denaturaliza-
tion judgment could not be obtained by the Government with relative ease.
Nevertheless, in later years, the Court broadened the rule in Schneiderman so
not calculated or intended to be presently acted upon, thus leaving opportunity for
general discussion and the calm process of thought and reason .... Because of this
difference we may assume that Congress intended, by the general test of "attachment"
in the 1906 Act, to deny naturalization to persons falling into the first category but
not to those in the second.
Id. at 157-58. Cf. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432 (1979) (dictum) (Burger, C.J.,
observing that the issue in Schneiderman was "basically factual").
89. See United States v. Zgrebec, 38 F. Supp. 127, 130 (E.D. Mich. 1941). But see
United States v. Wezel, 49 F. Supp. 16 (S.D. I1. 1943) (pre-Schneiderman case applying a
reasonable doubt burden in a denaturalization case); United States v. Sharrock, 276 F. 30,
32 (D. Mont. 1921) (an isolated instance in which a court foretold the "clear and
unequivocal" procedural ruling of Schneiderman).
90. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 125 (1943) (plurality opinion).
Variations of this standard govern several other "civil" proceedings. See Addington v.
Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979) ("clear and convincing" burden on the state in civil
commitment proceedings); Whitney v. SEC, 604 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Collins Sec.
Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("clear and convincing" evidence burden on
the Securities and Exchange Commission in anti-fraud enforcement proceedings). But see
Steadman v. SEC, 101 S. Ct. 999, 1009 (1981) (preponderance burden applies in SEC
enforcement proceedings by virtue of the Administrative Procedure Act).
91. 320 U.S. at 125.
92. Congress perceived the imposition of the heavier burden as a major obstacle to the
task of enforcing the law. See Act of Sept. 26, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-301, § 18, 75 Stat. 656;
note 50 supra.
93. See notes 49 to 51 and accompanying text supra.
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that the clear, unequivocal, and convincing standard of proof now pertains to all
denaturalization cases.s4 In all practicality, this expansive reading of Schneider-
man precludes the nightmarish results sure to have occurred if two different
burdens of proof applied in a suit brought on both statutory grounds
9 5
Of further precedential value, Justice Murphy indicated where the newly
adopted burden of proof was to fall on the continuum between the preponder-
ance and reasonable doubt standards. 96 Justice Murphy accomplished this result
without attempting the practically futile and certainly confining task of
formulating a precise definition for the clear and unequivocal standard. In
establishing the procedural precedent, the Court included a potentially powerful
qualification that the clear and unequivocal burden would not be satisfied if the
Government's case left "'the issue in doubt.' .97 In presenting the substantive
ruling that Schneiderman's advocacy of Communism was protected by the first
amendment, and hence, could not constitute a violation of the constitutionally
sound attachment statute, the Court employed this newly adopted burden much
the same as it would have employed the reasonable doubt standard in a criminal
case.
98
94. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960); Baumgartner v. United States,
322 U.S. 665, 670 (1944). Contra, Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. at 357 (Clark, J.,
dissenting).
95. See also United States v. DerManelian, 39 F. Supp. 959, 962 (D. R.I. 1941)
(pre-Schneiderman case in which burden of proof for the illegal procurement ground was a
version of the clear and convincing standard but preponderance of evidence standard was
applied to the fraud ground); 7 U. DET. L.J. 41, 42 (1944) (assuming that the
preponderance standard still applied to proving fraud ground in denaturalization suits).
96. For commentary on the traditional civil and criminal burdens of proof, see Wiehl,
Our Burden of Burdens, 41 WASH. L. REV. 109 (1966); Note, Burdens of Persuasion in
Criminal Proceedings; The Reasonable Doubt Standard After Patterson v. New York, 31
U. FLA. L. REV. 385 (1979). See also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), where Chief
Justice Burger stated the function served by a burden of proof:
The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process
Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to "instruct the factfinder concerning the
degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual
conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.". . . The standard serves to allocate
the risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance
attached to the ultimate decision.
Id. at 423 (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) Harlan, J., concurring)).
97. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. at 125 (quoting United States v.
Maxwell Land-Grant Co., 121 U.S. 325, 381 (1887)).
98. "This burden is substantially identical with that required in criminal cases -
proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 612 (1949).
Critics of Schneiderman also viewed the burden as extremely strict. See Balch,
Denaturalization Based on Disloyalty and Disbelief in Constitutional Principles, 29 MINN.
L. REV. 405, 435 (1945); Note, Schneiderman v. United States: Nullification of
Naturalization Laws?, 12 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 215, 221 (1943-44). In fact, one
commentator stated that the inclusion of "unequivocal" made the Schneiderman standard
tougher than the reasonable doubt burden. Burke, Interpretative Results of Wartime
Denaturalization Proceedings, 18 S. CAL. L. REV. 110, 121 n.89 (1944). Contra, Note, supra
note 20, at 46.
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This implementation of a stricter burden of proof, no doubt, deceived many
proponents for reform in immigration procedure.99 An undiscerning eye would
have welcomed the language in Schneiderman grounded in constitutional
safeguards implicitly assuring that Congress could not overturn the judicially
introduced procedure without a battle:
While it is our high duty to carry out the will of Congress, in the
performance of this duty we should have a jealous regard for the rights of
petitioner. We should let our judgment be guided so far as the law permits
by the spirit of freedom and tolerance in which our nation was founded, and
by a desire to secure the blessings of liberty in thought and action to all
those upon whom the right of American citizenship has been conferred by
statute, as well as to the native-born. And we certainly should presume that
Congress was motivated by these lofty principles. 10 0
This passage, and others similar to it, buttressed the substantive ruling in
Schneiderman but was peripheral to the procedural result of the decision.
Despite the Court's accent on the value of citizenship, Justice Murphy declined
to embark on a constitutionally based route of adopting the clear and
unequivocal burden upon reliance on either the citizenship or the due process
clause of the Constitution." 1 Such a route would have set a precedent for the
constitutional necessity of reform in denaturalization procedure. Instead, the
imposition of the burden of proof stemmed from the application of the "clear,
unequivocal and convincing" standard in United States v. Maxwell Land-Grant
Co.,10 2 an 1887 decision in which the Supreme Court revoked the grant of over
one million acres of land in New Mexico and Colorado upon proof of fraud.
Because the United States Government had placed its official seal of approval
on the grant, the Court in Maxwell was determined not to overturn the prior
decree without employing an exacting degree of proof.10 3
Chief Justice Stone, writing for the dissenting justices in Schneiderman,
criticized the plurality opinion for relying on fraudulent land grant revocations
for precedent in illegal procurement suits:
As we are not here considering whether petitioner's certificate of
naturalization was procured by fraud, there is no occasion, and indeed no
justification, for importing into this case the rule, derived from land fraud
cases, that fraud, which involves personal moral obliquity, must be proved by
clear and convincing evidence. The issue is not whether petitioner committed
a crime but whether he should be permitted to enjoy citizenship when he has
99. See, e.g., Gordon, Denaturalization in the Supreme Court, 8 FED. B.J. 172, 187
(1947).
100. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 120 (1943) (plurality opinion).
101. The Supreme Court has confirmed this analysis. See Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S.
252, 264-67 (1980). See also Comment, Constitutional Law - Denaturalization Under the
Immigration and Naturalization Act of 1952, 51 MICH. L. REV. 881, 888 (1953).
102. 121 U.S. 325 (1887).
103. Id. at 381.
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never satisfied the basic conditions which Congress required for the grant of
that privilege. We are concerned only with the question whether petitioner's
qualifications were so lacking that he was not lawfully entitled to the
privilege of citizenship which he has procured.
0 4
Justice Stone's criticism suggests that Schneiderman should have been denatur-
alized in an effortless fashion without a heavy burden of proof and without an
onus of proving intent to violate immigration law. Although Justice Stone's
conclusion runs contrary to the contention that defendants in denaturalization
suits ought to be afforded a more sophisticated level of due process, his criticism
is apt because it indicates difficulties inherent in analogizing denaturalization
cases to property and patent suits. Schneiderman, in effect, perpetuated this
ill-conceived judicial analogy first presented by the Court in Johannessen.
Despite the flawed analogy to property revocations, the Court in Schneider-
man further emphasized that denaturalization is not a typical civil suit by
restricting the Government to proving only the specific allegations contained in
the show cause complaint. In authorizing this departure from strict civil
procedure, Justice Murphy noted, "[a] denaturalization suit is not a criminal
proceeding. But neither is it an ordinary civil action since it involves an
important adjudication of status."'0 5 Thus, the Court in Schneiderman qualified
the restriction to avoid any inference that criminal procedures apply in
denaturalization proceedings.
In the later case of Baumgartner v. United States, °6 the Court further
differentiated the denaturalization suit from an ordinary civil proceeding by
stating that the Court would carefully review the facts found by the trial level
denaturalization court. This 1944 decision held that the German-American
defendant, by sympathizing with the Nazi movement, had not violated the
attachment requirement.0 7 Justice Frankfurter stated that careful review of
the lower court's "findings of fact" was necessary in order to ensure compliance
with the burden of proof, established in Schneiderman, of clear and unequivocal
evidence:
Deference properly due to the findings of a lower court does not preclude the
review here of such judgments. This recognized scope of appellate review is
usually differentiated from review of ordinary questions of fact by being
called review of a question of law, but that is often not an illuminating test
and is never self-executing. Suffice it to say that. . . the importance of [the
burden of proof in Schneiderman], on which to rest the cancellation of a
certificate of naturalization would be lost if the ascertainment by the lower
courts . ..were to be deemed a "'fact'" of the same order as all other
"'facts' ", not open to review here.1
0 8
104. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. at 178 (Stone, C.J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
105. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. at 160 (dictum).
106. 322 U.S. 665 (1944).
107. Id. at 677.
108. Id. at 671 (emphasis added).
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This review of the lower court findings of fact somewhat neutralizes the
compromising position in which a naturalized citizen is placed by the knowledge
that his naturalization decree is perpetually open to attack.'1 9 In Baumgartner,
Justice Frankfurter emphasized that careful review of denaturalization deci-
sions ensured that the Supreme Court would not be foreclosed from review of a
lower court's application of the facts to the law because the lower court
mistakenly characterized this application as a finding of fact." °
This slow drift toward application of stricter standards in denaturalization
suits partially allays the concern that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are
inadequate to provide optimum protection for citizens in denaturalization suits.
Perhaps the Rules will suffice for the ordinary denaturalization case, but the
need for change becomes more compelling when the injustice is more apparent.
The critical alert, reflecting the need for improved denaturalization procedures,
was sounded in 1948 when a trial court attempted to fit the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure to an unusual set of denaturalization facts.
In Klapprott v. United States,"' the Government filed a denaturalization
suit against the defendant under the 1940 version of the Act, alleging that
Klapprott's participation in the German Bund Movement 1 2 in 1941 was "prima
facie" evidence of his lack of "attachment" to the United States. Prior to the end
of the notice period required under the denaturalization statute, the Govern-
ment arrested Klapprott for allegedly violating certain criminal provisions of
the Selective Service Act."' The American Civil Liberties Union unsuccessfully
defended Klapprott in the criminal case, but did not provide for his defense in
the denaturalization suit. While still in jail, Klapprott, ill and without funds for
legal assistance, failed to appear in court and to defend in the denaturalization
suit. Predictably, pursuant to rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
default judgment was entered against the defendant." 4 Thus, Klapprott lost his
American citizenship without any demand on the Government to present
evidence in court to substantiate its allegations. Four years later, while
109. See text accompanying notes 72 to 86 supra. The naturalized citizen is also in a
precarious situation because the Government merely needs to compile enough evidence to
submit a show cause complaint to the court to institute an action. The potential misuse of
the process is not hard to envision.
110. 322 U.S. at 671.
111. 335 U.S. 601, modified, 336 U.S. 942 (1949).
112. During World War II, the general consensus was that the Bund Movement was
designed to support and promote the German-Axis Government. See Keegan v. United
States, 325 U.S. 478, 481-82 (1945); United States v. Sautter, 54 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Ill.
1943).
113. The criminal case is unreported and the citation for the exact amended version of
the Selective Service Act with which Klapprott was charged is not contained in any of
Klapprott's reported immigration proceedings. The current version of the Selective Service
Act is located at 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451-473 (1976).
114. Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, modified, 336 U.S. 942 (1949). Rule
55(a) states: "When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief has failed to
plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear by
affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter his default." FED. R. Civ. P. 55(a).
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Klapprott was still in jail, a deportation order was entered against him.
Klapprott then moved for relief from the default judgment in accordance with
rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Relief was denied because of
the time lag from the default order until his attempt to set aside that order.115
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the defendant to review the
default judgment.' 16 Meanwhile, Congress had amended rule 60(b)" 7 but the
amendment had not gone into effect when the Supreme Court heard the case. If
construed liberally, the amendment would have allowed the lower court more
discretion in reversing a default judgment despite Klapprott's recalcitrance in
seeking relief. The splintered majority in Klapprott employed the newer version
of rule 60(b) even though the amended rule technically was not available. More
importantly, the Court construed the purpose of the amendment so as to
alleviate Klapprott of his predicament. 8
While the narrow holding in Klapprott was that default judgments in
denaturalization suits are valid only if the Government fulfills its burden of
proof in court," 9 dictum in Justice Black's majority opinion reveals an
inclination toward a broader ruling: "The undenied allegations. . . show that a
citizen was stripped of his citizenship by his Government, without evidence, a
hearing, or the benefit of counsel, at a time when his Government was then
holding the citizen in jail with no reasonable opportunity for him effectively to
defend his right to citizenship."' 2 ° Nonetheless, the Klapprott decision has not
been read expansively to require the free assistance of counsel for indigents in
denaturalization suits.
115. United States v. Klapprott, 6 F.R.D. 450 (D. N.J. 1947), rev'd and remanded, 335
U.S. 601, modified, 336 U.S. 942 (1949). The unamended version of rule 60(b) which
applied to Klapprott's case required that motions for relief from default orders had to be
made within six months of the default. 6 F.R.D. at 451.
116. 334 U.S. 818 (1948).
117. The amendment, which went into effect in October, 1949 (approximately nine
months after the initial Supreme Court decision, 335 U.S. 601 (1949)), is the current
version of rule 60(b). The amendment introduced the liberalizing language that "the court
may relieve a party ... from a final judgment. . . for ... (6) any other reason justifying
relief from the operation of the judgment." FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
118. Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. at 613-14 ("[H]e was no more able to defend
himself in the New Jersey court than he would have been had he never received notice of
the charges." Id. at 614). Since Klapprott, the interpretation of rule 60(b)(6) has been
narrowed. See, e.g., Ackermann v. United States, 340 US. 193 (1950).
119. Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. at 612. The Court ordered that the default
judgment be set aside and that the case be remanded for a trial on the merits of the
denaturalization suit. Subsequently, this holding was modified, 336 U.S. 942 (1949), to
order that the case be remanded with directions to weigh the evidence in Klapprott's rule
60(b) motion to decide if the default judgment ought to be vacated. Justices Black,
Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge dissented from this modified order. Upon remand,
Klapprott v. United States, 183 F.2d 474 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 896 (1950), it was
decided that the default judgment should not be vacated by means of the rule 60(b)
amendment.
120. Id. at 615 (emphasis added).
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Rutledge implied that by straining to fit
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to the Klapprott facts, Justice Black's
majority opinion had missed the forest for the trees. Justice Rutledge confronted
the truly vital issues which surfaced in Klapprott:
To treat a denaturalization proceeding, whether procedurally or
otherwise, as if it were nothing more than a suit for damages for breach of
contract or one to recover overtime pay ignores, in my view, every
consideration of justice and of reality concerning the substance of the suit
and what is at stake.
To take away a man's citizenship deprives him of a right no less
precious than life or liberty, indeed of one which today comprehends those
rights and almost all others. To lay upon the citizen the punishment of exile
for committing murder, or even treason, is a penalty thus far unknown to
our law and at most but doubtfully within Congress' power. U.S. Const.,
Amend. VIII. Yet by the device or label of a civil suit, carried forward with
none of the safeguards of criminal procedure provided by the Bill of Rights,
this most comprehensive and basic right of all, so it has been held, can be
taken away and in its wake may follow the most cruel penalty of banishment.
If, in deference to the Court's rulings, we are to continue to have two
classes of citizens in this country, one secure in their status and the other
subject at every moment to its loss by proceedings not applicable to the
other class . . . I cannot assent to the idea that the ordinary rules of
procedure in civil causes afford any standard sufficient to safeguard the
status given to naturalized citizens. If citizenship is to be defeasible for
naturalized citizens, other than by voluntary renunciation or other causes
applicable to native-born citizens, the defeasance it seems to me should be
surrounded by no lesser protections than those securing all citizens against
conviction for crime. Regardless of the name given it, the denaturalization
proceeding when it is successful has all the consequences and effects of a
penal or criminal conviction, except that the ensuing liability to deportation
is a greater penalty than is generally inflicted for crime.
Regarding the proceeding in this light, I do not assent in principle that
the judgment of denaturalization can be taken by default or that the rules of




This lone but powerful attack on the potential injustice in a denaturalization
procedure has gone virtually unnoticed.
122
The Court, on occasion, has departed from its traditional method of
mechanically separating strictly civil from strictly criminal procedures. Ex-
amination of the isolated instances when they have done so in a denaturaliza-
tion case, however, reveals that the blending of civil and criminal procedure
121. Id. at 616-19 (Rutledge, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
122. See, e.g., 62 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1949). But see, e.g., Nesselson & Lubet, Eyewitness
Identification in War Crimes Trials, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 71, 77-78 (1980).
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runs contrary to the Court's philosophy. In fact, in Brown v. United States,12 3
the Court's reluctance was evidenced by its approval of a compromise method,
conceived by a lower court, of applying fractions of both the civil and criminal
rules on the privilege against self-incrimination within the same revocation
proceeding.
During Brown's denaturalization hearing, the Government called her as an
adverse (involuntary) witness. Invoking her fifth amendment privilege, Brown
refused to answer questions relating to her past Communist activities. The
lower court responded by applying the civil "privilege" rule for involuntary
witnesses which allows the court to draw adverse inferences from her refusal to
answer. 124 Subsequent to the Government's questioning, Brown's defense
counsel strategically was compelled to question her to overcome adverse
inferences which may have been taken from her silence regarding her past
Communist activities. Defense counsel chose to question her on direct rather
than on cross-examination, and thus transformed Brown from an involuntary to
a voluntary witness. The Government, on cross-examination, asked Brown the
same questions to which she previously had asserted her self-incrimination
privilege. 1 25 At this juncture, the lower court switched procedural tracks by
invoking the criminal "privilege" rule on voluntary witnesses. The criminal rule
holds that a voluntary witness loses his privilege from the moment he takes the
stand, 126 whereas the applicable civil rule holds that the privilege is not lost
until the defendant specifically commits some self-incriminating act.' 27 Had the
lower court judge consistently applied procedural rules which blend with rather
than contradict prior rulings on the same issue, Brown could not have been held
in contempt. In effect, the lower court presented Brown with a no-win situation
and, thus, found her in contempt for failure to answer.
By upholding the contempt judgment, the Supreme Court's five-four
majority refused to recognize the purpose underlying the seemingly confining
voluntary privilege rule in criminal procedure. The defendant in a criminal trial
ordinarily would not become a voluntary witness in order to overcome adverse
inferences drawn as an involuntary witness because adverse inferences drawn
from a witness' silence are prohibited in criminal proceedings. 12 ' The Supreme
Court, in effect, dropped Brown into a procedural morass in which civil and
123. 356 U.S. 148 (1958).
124. See Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1923).
125. Brown v. United States, 234 F.2d 140, 142-43 (6th Cir. 1956), aff'd, 356 U.S. 148
(1958).
126. See Raffel v. United States, 271 U.S. 494, 497 (1926). In Brown, the Sixth Circuit
maintained that the criminal rule was applicable because the defendant testified on direct
to matters of crucial interest to the Government. 234 F.2d at 144. But see Brown v. United
States, 356 U.S. 148, 157 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
127. Arndstein v. McCarthy, 254 U.S. 71 (1920).
128. 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1976).
1981]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
criminal law converge to diminish rather than to enhance individual constitu-
tional guarantees.
129
The lesson from Brown, that the mixture of civil and criminal procedure is
inappropriate in denaturalization proceedings, was clearly confirmed in an
immigration case involving expatriation. In Trop v. Dulles, 3" decided on the
same day as Brown, a plurality of the Court found that the sanction of
expatriation, when applied to the facts in Trop, constituted not only punishment
but cruel and unusual punishment.13 ' The clearer expression of the implication
of Brown is found in the dicta of Chief Justice Warren's plurality opinion in
Trop: "Denaturalization is not imposed to penalize the alien for having falsified
his application for citizenship; if it were, it would be a punishment.' ' 32 Thus,
forty-five years after Johannessen, the Supreme Court had not adjusted its rigid
categorization of denaturalization as a civil remedy in equity to be governed by
the denaturalization statute and by the rules of civil procedure, notwithstanding
the hardships revealed, for example, in the Klapprott case. Furthermore, the
flaws in the procedure, evident upon reading Johannessen, Schneiderman,
Baumgartner, Klapprott, Brown, and Trop, have lain dormant until recently.
They have resurfaced in the last five years because the Government has
instituted a series of denaturalization and deportation suits against alleged
Nazi war criminals.
TESTING THE PROCEDURE IN AN EMERGENCY - THE CASE
OF THE ALLEGED WAR CRIMINAL
The Government's pursuit of Nazi war criminals in the United States for
purposes of enforcing immigration law is just now getting under way, some
thirty-five years off-schedule. At this time, legal action has been taken against
twenty-five individuals. 133 Several cases have been adjudicated extensively
129. In dissent, Justice Black unfortunately, but understandably, reacted by urging
that the Court adhere to its tradition of separating strictly civil from strictly criminal
procedure. 356 U.S. at 157. This response presumably was directed first to the result in
Brown of impinging on rather than expanding defendants' rights in denaturalization
proceedings, and second, to the lack of foresight in the lower court's failure to consider the
consequences of isolated rulings on the total procedural picture.
130. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
131. Id. at 101. Cf. Vance v. Terrazas, 444 U.S. 252 (1980) (limiting the reforming
efforts in Trop). See text accompanying notes 195 to 213 infra.
132. 356 U.S. at 98.
133. Fedorenko v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 737 (1981) (affirming order of denaturali-
zation); United States v. Walus, No. 77-C-279 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 26, 1980) (overturning
denaturalization after Seventh Circuit order for new trial based on newly discovered
evidence); United States v. Soobzokov, No. 79-3468 (D. N.J., July 11, 1980) (order by
consent judgment that the citizenship of defendant would not be revoked); Ryan v. United
States, 360 F. Supp. 265 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (upholding effect of defendant's consent to
surrender her citizenship); United States v. Karklins, No. 81-460 (C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 29,
1981) (defendant's answer to denaturalization complaint submitted on time); United
States v. Kairys, No. 80-C-4302 (N.D. Ill., filed Aug. 13, 1980) (filing of defendant's answer
to denaturalization complaint postponed to permit the Government to comply with
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including, Fedorenko v. United States, where the Supreme Court upheld a decree
of denaturalization against Feodor Fedorenko.' 34 In addition, in 1980, Frank
Walus, who had been stripped of his citizenship by the Northern District of
Illinois, was victorious in overturning the prior denaturalization decree' 35 after
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals had ordered a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence. After a five-year ordeal, Valerian Trifa, a Bishop in the
Eastern Orthodox Church, conceded the Government's denaturalization case
against him in the fall of 1980. Trifa's immediate vulnerability to deportation is
slight, however, because the trial court for the Eastern District of Michigan
indefinitely postponed Trifa's deportation hearing pending an interim appeal by
defendant's discovery requests); United States v. Dercacz, No. 80-CIV-1854 (E.D.N.Y.,
filed July 7, 1980) (denaturalization case in discovery); United States v. Trucis, No.
80-2321 (E.D. Pa., filed June 20, 1980) (denaturalization case in discovery); United States
v. Linnas, No. 79-C-2966 (E.D.N.Y., filed Nov. 29, 1979) (denaturalization case in
discovery); United States v. Osidach, No. 79-4212 (E.D. Pa., filed Nov. 20, 1979)
(denaturalization trial completed in Nov. 1980; decision pending); United States v. Koziy,
No. 79-6640-CIV-JCP (S.D. Fla., filed Oct. 20, 1979) (denaturalization case in discovery);
United States v. Demjanjuk, No. C77-923 (N.D. Ohio, filed Aug. 25, 1977) (denaturaliza-
tion trial commenced Feb. 10, 1981); United States v. Kowalchuk, No. 77-118 (E.D. Pa.,
filed Jan. 13, 1977) (denaturalization court upheld defendant's claimed fifth amendment
privilege to refuse to answer about his World War II activities; case in discovery as of June
22, 1981); United States v. Kowalchuk, No. 77-119 (E.D. Pa., filed Jan. 13, 1977) (same);
In re Detlavs, No. A7-925-159 (Bd. Imm. App., filed March 21, 1980) (deportation case
dismissed at INS hearing in Balto., Md. - case argued before Bd. of Imm. App. on Aug. 4,
1980); In re Artukovic, No. A7-095-961 (Bd. Imm. App., filed March 7, 1980)
(Government appeal to set aside stay of deportation order granted in 1959); In re Hazners,
No. A10-305-336 (Bd. Imm. App., filed March 5, 1980) (oral argument in Government
deportation appeal heard Sept. 4, 1980; decision pending); In re Trifa, No. A7-819-396
(INS, Detroit, Mich., filed Oct. 29, 1980) (deportation proceeding stayed pending
defendant's appeal to Sixth Circuit on the effect of defendant's consent to surrender
citizenship on Sept. 3, 1980); In re Paskevicious (a/k/a Pasker), No. A7-497-596 (INS,
Miami, Fla., filed June 24, 1980) (defendant consented to relinquish citizenship on Aug.
23, 1979 in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California; on Dec. 16, 1980,
deportation judge found defendant mentally incompetent to stand trial and ordered him to
be examined periodically); In re Maikovskis, No. A8-194-566 (INS, NYC, N.Y., filed Dec.
20, 1976) (deportation case remains in discovery after the Second Circuit order of Sept. 13,
1978 that the defendant could not claim a fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination and after a Board of Immigration Appeals ruling on Jan. 9, 1981 that the
Government could conduct fair depositions in the Soviet Union despite the fact that
Maikovskis was tried in absentia and, thereafter, found guilty of war crimes in Latvia in
1965); In re Kaminskas, No. A6-659-477 (INS, Hartford, Conn., filed Oct. 13, 1976)
(deportation case adjourned sine die with order for periodic monitoring of defendant's
mental and physical fitness to stand trial). See also ADDENDUM following note 249.
134. 101 S. Ct. 737 (1981). The Government filed suit to deport Fedorenko. In re
Fedorenko, No. A7-333-468 (INS, Hartford, Conn., filed March 5, 1981).
135. United States v. Walus, No. 77-C-279 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 26, 1980). Newly
discovered evidence was offered during the trial on remand which prompted the trial court
to find Walus not liable. Hence, the Government abandoned its efforts to denaturalize
Walus. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1980, § 1, at 20, col. 2.
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Trifa of the denaturalization consent judgment.1 3 6 A more surprising result
arose from the deportation case of Andrija Artukovic. Artukovic, the unsuccess-
ful defendant in the Government's first war criminal deportation in 1952,137 has
been successful in warding off a request by the Yugoslavian Government for his
extradition, 138 as well as in receiving an official stay of deportation from the
United States Government. In all, only one person, Hermine Braunsteiner
Ryan, has been forced to leave the country. She voluntarily consented to
relinquish her naturalized status in 1971,139 and was extradited to West
Germany, where she is currently on trial for her wartime activities as a guard
at the Ravensbruick and Majdanek concentration camps. 140
Although the denaturalization of war criminals is in its infancy, it is
already apparent that the courts are reluctant to prevent the injustices inherent
in trying a seriously violent crime within a civil setting.14 Caught in a
dilemma comparable to that faced by previous defendants in denaturalization
suits, the alleged war criminals have attempted what has proven impossible to
arrange; they assert sixth and eighth amendment rights and request the
infusion of several of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure into their
respective proceedings.' 4 2 With few exceptions, their attempts to gain access to
these safeguards have proven futile because the courts cite the Johannessen-
Schneiderman holdings as the final, and only authority. 143 Not only the fate of
the citizenship status of alleged Nazi war criminals is at issue however; the
value of American citizenship itself is implicated in these cases precisely
because past war criminals are an undesirable group upon whom the priceless
treasure of citizenship ironically has been bestowed. 144 As citizens, they have a
136. In re Trifa, No. A7-819-396 (INS, Detroit, Mich., filed Oct. 29, 1980). See N.Y.
Times, Nov. 19, 1980, § 1, at 29, col. 6.
137. See Order Denying Request for Suspension of Deportation of Apr. 3, 1953, In re
Artukovic (on file at the Office of Special Investigations, Criminal Division, U.S.
Department of Justice).
138. In re Artukovic, 170 F. Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959). But see ADDENDUM following
note 249.
139. The Ryan court held that the Government need not prove its case if the defendant
consents to the surrender of citizenship. Ryan v. United States, 360 F. Supp. 265, 270
(E.D.N.Y. 1973).
140. N.Y. Times, June 17, 1978, § 1, at 17, col. 2. See ADDENDUM following note 249.
141. See, e.g., United States v. Walus, 453 F. Supp. 699 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
142. See, e.g., id. at 716 (denial of sixth amendment rights); Opinion and Order
Denying Defendant's Motion for Reimbursement of Travel Expenses of June 14, 1979,
United States v. Trifa, No. 5-70924 (E.D. Mich., Sept. 4, 1980) (denial of access to FED. R.
CRIM. P. 15(c) in a denaturalization case).
143. See, e.g., Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 657, 673 (1946).
144. See Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. at 675-76 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting):
My concern is not for Paul Knauer. . . . He was a thoroughgoing Nazi, addicted to
philosophies altogether hostile to the democratic framework in which we believe and
live . . . . Not merely Knauer's rights, but those of millions of naturalized citizens in
their status and all that it implies of security and freedom, are affected by what is
done in this case. By the outcome they are made either second-class citizens or citizens
having equal rights and equal security with others.
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right to procedures which will protect them in the short run, but which truly
will protect the value of American citizenship in the long run.
Accordingly, an emergency situation reminiscent of Klapprott145 arose once
again in the history of statutory denaturalization reflecting strong reasons why
the use of the denaturalization process is inimical to the rights of these
defendants. First, the result of the denaturalization of an alleged war criminal
is that the alien is then officially labeled a "war criminal."'4 6 The resulting
public opprobrium towards the branded individual could be devastating. 147 If
the procedural safeguards were more protective of his rights, the public would
be more confident that the alien was identified correctly, which would
correspondingly enhance the public contempt towards the individual. An
innocent person, however, should not have to endure this form of mental
torture.
Second, there is a time factor applicable to all denaturalization suits but
taken to extremes in the war criminal cases because of the thirty to forty year
delays plaguing the Government's enforcement of immigration policy. There is
no statute of limitations attached to the denaturalization statute, 148 and the
courts have uniformly rejected laches as a defense. 149 Also, there is no statute of
limitations barring a trial of World War II criminals on the charge of war
crimes, 150 although this has been the subject of much debate in Congress 15 1 as
well as in the international legal and legislative community. 152 Thus, the
alleged war criminal who lied in obtaining his citizenship is vulnerable not only
145. 335 U.S. 601, modified, 336 U.S. 942 (1949).
146. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Sam Polur, Counsel for Jewish Defense League,
United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979) (a compilation of newspaper
clippings leading a reader to the conclusion that Fedorenko had been a savage war
criminal).
147. See Letter from William Lehman, M.C. & Hamilton Fish, Jr., M.C. to President
Ronald Reagan (Feb. 6, 1981) (signed by 104 Congressmen) ("[Continuing the appropria-
tions for the Special Investigations Unit] will . . . serve as a warning that civilized
nations will never again tolerate such base inhumanity.").
148. 3 GORDON & ROSENFIELD, supra note 16, at § 20.2e (a statute of limitations had
been proposed by the House in 1973 but was never enacted).
149. E.g., Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265, 281-84 (1961) (traditionally, laches
could not be used against the sovereign). Cf. Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392 (1946)
(recognizing the power of federal equity court to infuse a period of limitations into a
statute when Congress had not provided for a statute of limitations).
150. See N.Y. Times, July 4, 1979, § 1, at 1, col. 2 (West German Government
removing its statute of limitations for murder).
151. See N.Y. Times, May 10, 1979, § 1, at 3, col. 1 (House of Representatives
approving resolution which urges West Germany to extend its statute of limitations on
prosecuting Nazi war criminals).
152. See Lerner, The Convention of the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to
War Crimes, 4 ISRAEL L. REV. 512 (1969).
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to denaturalization and eventual deportation suits in America, but also to war
crime trials abroad"5 3 as long as he lives.1
5 4
This time factor, generally foreign to American courts, operates to the
benefit or detriment of both parties in a denaturalization proceeding. Because of
the delay, memories have faded and witnesses have died, thus affecting the trial
strategies of the litigants. To arouse the judge's sympathy,155 war criminal
defendants argue that equity dictates that because they are now and have been
model American citizens for years, acts which they may or may not have
committed more than thirty-five years ago, including the illegal attainment of
American citizenship, should not be unearthed at this late date. 156
Practically, the time factor operates more as a handicap to the Government
than to the war criminal defendant. After the decision in Klapprott,'5 7 the
Government will not be able to prevail in a denaturalization suit without first
satisfying its burden of proof. This will be difficult to attain because the Nazi
terror resulted in the attempted elimination of an entire race'58 so that very few
victims are alive today to retell the horror of the holocaust. The task of locating
survivors who were eyewitnesses to the brutality of a particular individual, or of
obtaining and being allowed to submit into evidence foreign documents which
tend to incriminate an individual who may have been involved in mass
153. Although only one former United States citizen is on trial abroad, several war
crime trials in Europe are in progress or have recently concluded. E.g., N.Y. Times, Jan.
16, 1981, § 1, at 3, col. 5 (Dutch Supreme Court upholding conviction of Pieter Menten for
guilt in the murder of Jews during World War II); N.Y. Times, March 9, 1980, § 1, at 6,
col. 3 (Ernst Heinrichsohn sentenced to six years in prison by West German Government
for complicity in death camp murders of over 70,000 Jews during World War II).
154. Of historical and legal interest, the alleged war criminal may also be the victim of
kidnapping. For example, in 1961, Israeli agents kidnapped Adolf Eichmann in Argentina.
Upon Eichmann's forced arrival in Israel, he was put on trial and found guilty of
numerous war crimes. Once Argentina accepted Israel's diplomatic apology for the act,
Eichmann had no legally viable complaint because an individual can only press a claim in
international courts if he is represented by a nation. Further, the Israeli legal community
holds that the Eichmann incident would not have been considered a violation of
Argentinian sovereignty even if a claim had been pursued by that South American
country. According to the consensus of the Israeli legal community, there is international
jurisdiction to apprehend war criminals. Lecture by Gideon Hausner (Chief Prosecutor at
the Eichmann trial), delivered at Hebrew University School of Law, Mt. Scopus campus,
Jerusalem, Israel, Aug. 13, 1979. See generally Lasok, The Eichmann Trial, 11 INT'I COMP.
L.Q. 355 (1962).
155. Compare Order Striking Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, United
States v. Trifa, No. 5-70924 (E.D. Mich., Sept. 4, 1980) with United States v. Fedorenko,
455 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
156. United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. at 918-21. But see Fedorenko v. United
States, 101 S. Ct. 737, 752-53 (1981).
157. 335 U.S. 601, modified, 336 U.S. 942 (1949).
158. See L. DAWIDOWIcz, THE WAR AGAINST THE JEWS 1933-1945 (1975) 341. ("The
Final Solution was a new phenomenon in human history.").
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executions, is even more frustrated by the passage of more than three
decades.' 5
9
A third reason why present denaturalization procedure is violative of
defendants' rights in the war criminal suits is the international nature of these
actions. The cases vividly portray the hardships of a defendant who might be
without funds to hire an attorney or to pay for an extensive undertaking during
discovery.' s Congress, on the other hand, has allocated a considerable amount
of funds to the Special Investigations Unit of the Department of Justice to try
alleged war criminals on immigration matters. 6 ' As a result, the Government
has been able to locate the best witnesses and to benefit from their testimony
notwithstanding the fact that the best witness may live in Romania and may
require the services of a translator. 162 Unless a defendant is wealthy, his
finances cannot match the Government's resources. 63 It arguably follows that
all needy defendants in denaturalization suits should be provided with free
counsel and with Government funds to adequately prepare for their defense
'64
Because immigration procedure presents a challenge even to the experienced
attorney, it is ludicrous to expect that such a needy defendant could represent
himself effectively without competent counsel.
A final factor in considering the war criminal denaturalization as an
extreme case for needed reform is the emotional level at trial. For those who
have tried to forget, or for those who have forced themselves to remember, this
civil hearing is a harrowing ordeal,6 5 not only because of painful memories, but
159. For a discussion of the complexities involved and examples of the leeway
available to trial judges, see United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
160. See, e.g., United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 899 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
161. See N.Y. Times, March 25, 1979, § 1, at 21, col. 1.
162. See N.Y. Times, June 14, 1979, § 1, at 6, col. 1 (Romanian Chief Rabbi testifying
that in 1941, Trifa participated in a massacre of Bucharest Jews); N.Y. Times, Jan. 10,
1979, § 1, at 12, col. 4 (Israeli woman to testify at deportation hearing of Detlavs in Balto.,
Md.). See also The Jewish Week, Feb. 12-18, 1981, at 6, col. 1 (Director of Special
Investigations Unit, Allan A. Ryan, Jr., will attend the World Gathering of Holocaust
Survivors to be held in Israel in June, 1981; he seeks to locate witnesses to testify in the
Nazi immigration cases in the United States).
163. See United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 899 (S.D. Fla. 1978) (trial
judge's attempt to fill in the gap between the Government's ample funds and the
defendant's lack of funds).
164. Cf. SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST (March 1, 1981) (Recommending that indigent
permanent resident aliens be provided with free counsel in deportation or exclusion
hearings).
165. See D. RABINOWITZ, NEW LIVES: SURVIVORS OF THE HOLOCAUST LIVING IN AMERICA
(1976) 70, 206-08; M. Rabinowitz, Nazis in Skokie: Fighting Words or Heckler's Veto?, 28
DEPAUL L. REV. 259 (1979):
[W]hen individuals and/or the group with which they are affiliated have been
subjected to severe and repeated traumatic experience, these individuals will be prone
to respond to any reminders of their persecution in a total fashion, as if they were
again subjected to the totality of noxious conditions under which painful associations
were originally formed.




primarily because the immigration cases are perceived as a means to continue
the Nuremberg task of punishing war criminals. This perception is shared by a
number of congressmen who view funding the immigration cases of alleged Nazi
war criminals "as a small price to pay for reaffirming [the American]
commitment at Nuremberg that none of those who participated in Nazi
atrocities should escape being called to account. '1 6 Thus, the Nazi immigration
cases represent an attempt to superimpose elements of justice into an
interaction, between oppressors and victims, which was devoid of civilization,
much less justice.
For example, the concentration camp where most of the surviving witnesses
were incarcerated during World War II has been described as a "life in
death.' 167 "Life" in the death camp was based on an irrational master plan
which would result in the death of an inmate - who initially had been
"selected" for life - if he did behave according to the rules. Survival was based
on luck (or divine grace) and on acts which surreptitiously circumvented
obedience. 68 This antithesis of civilized behavior produced an interaction
between victim and oppressor incomprehensible to human culture.'69 Encour-
aged memories of this interaction in the American courtroom have produced
shocking testimony and many emotional outbursts. i v Because the concentra-
tion camps were part of an overall Nazi campaign of genocide, it is difficult to
compare the emotional testimony in the Nazi immigration cases to testimony in
other cases where proof of violent crimes has also produced a high degree of
emotion at trial.
166. Letter from William Lehman, M.C. & Hamilton Fish, Jr., M.C. to President
Ronald Reagan (Feb. 6, 1981) (signed by 104 Congressmen). ("We must, in the limited
time remaining, make clear to the world that the United States has not forgotten this
unparalleled tragedy."). Cf. Note, supra note 20, at 48 ("[Tlhe wickedness of the
concealment pales before the wickedness of the fact concealed.").
167. T. DES PRES, THE SURVIVOR: AN ANATOMY OF LIFE IN THlE DEATH CAMPS 109 (1976).
See The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 60, 126-30 (factual account of the atrocities flowing
from the Final Solution). See also E. WIESEL, NIGHT 44 (1960) (personal account of a
survivor):
Never shall I forget that night, the first night in camp, which has turned my life into
one long night, seven times cursed and seven times sealed. Never shall I forget that
smoke. Never shall I forget the little faces of the children, whose bodies I saw turned
into wreaths of smoke beneath a silent blue sky.
Never shall I forget those flames which consumed my faith forever.
Never shall I forget that nocturnal silence which deprived me, for all eternity, of the
desire to live. Never shall I forget those moments which murdered my God and my
soul and turned my dreams to dust. Never shall I forget these things, even if I am
condemned to live as long as God Himself. Never.
168. T. DES PRES, THE SURVIVOR: AN ANATOMY OF LIFE IN THE DEATH CAMPS 111-74
(1976).
169. Id. at 177-209.
170. D. RABINOWITZ, NEW LIVES: SURVIVORS OF THE HOLOCAUST LIVING IN AMERICA 5-45
(1976). Because of this problem, some judges have attempted to exclude the public from
attending certain immigration cases. To date, these attempts have been unsuccessful. See,
e.g., Pechter v. Lyons, 441 F. Supp. 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (preliminary injunction granted
because of abuse of discretion by immigration judge in barring public attendance to the
deportation hearing of Boleslavs Maikovskis).
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This factor of emotion will be quite difficult for the judge to control.171
Therefore, the guarantee to the defendant of a fair trial in accord with due
process requirements, based on probative and compelling evidence, 1 72 is in
danger of being jeopardized. The danger is that a misplaced objective of
vindicating the injustices performed by the Nazis 173 will be confused with the
statutory objective in these cases, which is to strip a war criminal of his
ill-gotten American citizenship.
RESPONDING TO THE EMERGENCY: PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS IN CITIZENSHIP LAW
One may argue that defendants in denaturalization suits should be
protected by the identical procedures afforded to those defendants accused of a
crime. This resolution might relieve the defendants from their legal predica-
ment, but it is a shallow solution to a very real procedural dilemma. Comparing
denaturalization to a criminal proceeding is invalid because the paramount
congressional intent of section 340 is disregarded in this process. Former Chief
Justice Warren addressed this issue in Trop v. Dulles,174 where he stated that
Congress enacted the denaturalization statute "in the exercise of the power to
make rules for the naturalization of aliens."' 75 This sovereign power to regulate
171. See, e.g., United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 899 n.9 (S.D. Fla. 1978),
rev'd, 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979), affd on other grounds, 101 S. Ct. 737 (1981) ("If ever a
case supported the Judicial Conference ruling barring cameras from the courtroom, this
case does. From the beginning it was like a Hollywood spectacular and polarized the
residents of South Florida.").
172. Critics have observed that survivor testimony is unreliable because survivors
suffer from 'hyperamnesia' - remembering events in great detail which never occurred or
which never occurred quite how they were remembered. See N.Y. Times, March 25, 1979,
§ IV, at 18, col. 5. But see Nesselson & Lubet, Eyewitness Identification in War Crimes
Trials, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 71, 89 (1980).
173. See Fedorenko v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 737 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting):
The gruesome facts recited in the record create what Justice Holmes described as a
sort of "hydraulic pressure" that tends to distort our judgment. Perhaps my refusal to
acquiesce in the conclusion reached by highly respected colleagues is attributable in
part to an overreaction to that pressure. . . . That human suffering will be a
consequence of today's venture is certainly predictable; that any suffering will be
allayed or avoided is at best doubtful.
Id. at 763; United States v. Walus, No. 77-C-279 (N.D. Ill., Nov. 26, 1980) (memorandum
order granting Government's motion to dismiss denaturalization suit with prejudice based
on newly discovered evidence offered at trial on remand from the Seventh Circuit):
In granting the Government's motion we do not forget the abominable atrocities
inflicted at the hands of the Nazis on those and the families of those who testified
against the defendant. But those outrages cannot be undone and certainly not by an
unjust conviction of the defendant. Indeed, we are confident that those who survived
the atrocities and seek vindication in the memory of those who did not would not want
their honor stained by a conviction which could not withstand careful dispassionate
scrutiny.
174. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
175. Id. at 98.
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the attainment of citizenship would be emasculated in a criminal scenario in
which the fundamental purpose is to punish. To de-emphasize this congressional
power of regulation is to welcome a de-valuation of American citizenship itself.
Hence, the attainment of a naturalization judgment should be as delicately
treated a procedure as should be the revocation of the judgment.
The congressional intent of section 340, therefore, requires that denatur-
alization be considered a civil proceeding. Moreover, the Bill of Rights
safeguards civil procedure by the fifth amendment due process clause. 176 There
is no unanimously accepted definition for "due process;'171 the cases involving
procedural due process reveal only that it is "flexible and calls for such
procedural protection as the particular situation demands.' 17 ' If the due process
clause attaches in an ordinary civil suit or an administrative grievance
procedure, the Supreme Court has required that the individual whose liberty or
property interest is at stake must receive notice of the threatened action and
have an opportunity to be heard, usually during "some kind" of trial-type
hearing. 7 s During the hearing, the due process interest of the individual is
"balanced" against constitutionally derived interests of the opposing party.1
8 0
These minimum guarantees of notice and hearing have applied when the
Government has sought to revoke the citizenship of naturalized Americans.'
8
'
The Supreme Court has proclaimed, however, that denaturalization is not
an ordinary civil suit, nor is it a mere administrative complaint process.18 2 The
minimum standard of notice and hearing contained in the denaturalization
statute, therefore, is an inadequate measure of the due process that ought to be
accorded to a defendant who may well be subject to the precarious sanctions of
expulsion and statelessness. The Supreme Court has paid more than lip service
to the testing of the due process protection owed to the defendant in a
176. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
177. E.g., Bogen, The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Guarantee of Freedom of
Speech, 35 MD. L. REV. 555, 556 n.16 (1976) (noting the argument that within the
combination of the due process and privileges and immunities clauses, all the guarantees
of the Bill of Rights are contained).
178. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). See also FCC v. WJR, 337 U.S.
265, 275 & n.9 (1949) (opinion by Rutledge, J.). But see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY & DISTRUST: A
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18-21 (1980) ("What has ensued has been a disaster in both
practical and theoretical terms. Not only has the number of occasions on which one is
entitled to any procedural protection at all been steadily constricted but the Court has
made itself look quite silly in the process.").
179. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 7 (1976)
(criticism of resort by judges to trial-type hearings to fulfill the requirement of being
heard); Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1267 (1975).
180. See Note, Specifying the Procedures Required by Due Process: Toward Limits on
the Use of Interest Balancing, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1510 (1975) (criticism of the balance test
because its implementation often has resulted in impinging on individual due process
rights).
181. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a), (b) (1976).
182. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 160 (1943) (plurality opinion)
(dictum).
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denaturalization proceeding by its institution of the clear and unequivocal
burden of proof, by its restriction on the Government not to go beyond the four
corners of the initial denaturalization complaint, and by its careful review of
facts concluded by the denaturalization trial court.
The Supreme Court's innovative task of employing procedures to ensure
that due process is given to defendants in denaturalization cases commensurate
with the degree of liberty at stake is far from complete, but blueprinting
additionally needed procedures does not dispose of the due process issue. The
due process issue will be adequately addressed only when the Supreme Court
adjusts its method of adopting innovative procedures so that it conforms with
the Constitution. If the Court does not say that the Bill of Rights prompted the
new procedure, the isolated procedure as well as the due process protection of
the overall procedure is made vulnerable. That is, Congress could pass
fill-in-the-gap legislation with relative ease, rendering the judicially introduced
procedure inapplicable unless the legislators are aware of the constitutional
challenge.
Thus far, the Supreme Court has not added procedural safeguards to the
denaturalization process by this constitutionally based approach. For example,
the imposition of the clear and unequivocal burden in Schneiderman was an
outgrowth of an antiquated analogy to property revocation proceedings."8 3 Also,
the dictum that the Government is restricted to proving allegations in the
denaturalization complaint,18 4 another inheritance from Schneiderman, appears
to be grounded in the practical realization that denaturalization looks like, but
is not, a criminal sanction. Finally, the careful review of lower denaturalization
court findings of fact in Baumgartner v. United States s5 though accomplished
in a forthright manner, amounted to no more than a procedural innovation
inferred from the institution of the burden of proof in Schneiderman.'
The Supreme Court, however, has introduced procedural safeguards into
other types of actions in conformity with the constitutionally inspired method.
In Addington v. Texas,"s7 the Court held that a "clear and convincing" burden of
proof must be met in civil commitment proceedings. In no effort to elude the due
process issue, Chief Justice Burger's unanimous opinion emphasized that "[tihe
question in this case is what standard of proof is required by the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution in a civil proceeding brought under state law to
commit an individual involuntarily for an indefinite period . . In Ad-
dington, the Court weighed the individual's liberty interest in remaining a
free member of society against Texas' responsibility under its parens patriae
183. Id. at 125.
184. Id. at 160.
185. 322 U.S. 665 (1944).
186. Id. at 670-71.
187. 441 U.S. 418 (1979) (Powell, J., not participating in the otherwise unanimous
decision). See 57 DET. J. URBAN L. 651 (1980); 6 0mo N.L. Rv. 597 (1979).
188. 441 U.S. at 419-20.
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power to -care for its citizens unable to care for themselves and its police power
to protect the community from dangerous mentally ill citizens."8 9 The Court
tipped the scales in favor of individual rights in requiring proof stricter than
traditionally required in civil law.
Thus, the constitutionally based method is no stranger to the Court's review
of civil or administrative procedure. In fact, the Court employed this constitu-
tional approach when the interest at stake was the mere loss of a driver's
license. 190 In denaturalization procedure, though, the Court has shied away
from these constitutional issues by cloaking judicially introduced procedures in
ill-fitting notions of equity. 191 This deviation in denaturalization procedure from
the Court's practice of squarely confronting due process implications appears to
fit comfortably into a recent trend of backsliding set by the Court in the larger
area of immigration procedure.
In deportation procedure, for example, the Court introduced the clear,
unequivocal and convincing burden of proof in 1966. In Woodby v. INS,'92 the
Government attempted to deport the defendant because of her alleged activities
as a prostitute. Justice Stewart maintained that the judicially imposed burden
of proof supplemented, rather than contradicted, the 1966 version of the
deportation statute.'9 3 Thus, an explicit balancing of the defendant's right to a
just deportation proceeding against the implied power of Congress to expel was
neatly avoided. In adopting the stricter evidentiary burden, the Court compared
this innovation in deportation procedure to the judicially introduced burden of
proof in Schneiderman,194 one which was not buttressed by the Bill of Rights.
The questionable judicial method employed by the Court in adopting the
burden of proof in Schneiderman has also led to separation of powers conflicts in
the area of expatriation procedure. In Vance v. Tarrazas,195 the Court set a
precedent for the 1980's for constricting due process and citizenship rights. In
this expatriation case, the Court upheld the power of Congress to pass section
349(c)' 96 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, thus enabling the Govern-
189. Id. at 431.
190. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
191. The Court recently refused to consider traditional doctrines of equity in a
denaturalization case, but did not hold, as a result, that denaturalization should be
removed from the jurisdiction of equity. Fedorenko v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 737,
752-53 (1981).
192. 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966).
193. Id. at 284. Contra, id. at 287 (Clark, J., dissenting):
The Court, by placing a higher standard of proof on the Government, in deportation
cases, has usurped the legislative function of the Congress and has in one full swoop
repealed the Congressionally established 'reasonable, substantial, and probative'
burden of proof placed on the Government by specific Act of the Congress . . .
194. Id. at 285-86.
195. 444 U.S. 252 (1980). See generally Comment, Limiting Congressional Denationa-
lization After Afroyim, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 121, 145-48 (1979); 32 BAVI.oR L. REv. 427
(1980).
196. 8 U.S.C. § 1481(c) (1976).
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ment to prove by a mere preponderance of the evidence that a dual national, a
citizen of the United States and Mexico since birth, had voluntarily renounced
his American citizenship when he took an oath of allegiance to the Mexican
Government.' 97
The issue of which burden of proof applies in expatriation proceedings had
previously been before the Supreme Court in 1958. In Nishikawa v. Dulles,198
the Warren Court held that the Government's burden of proof in an expatriation
proceeding must be that of a clear, unequivocal, and convincing standard.
Because Congress had not legislated on this evidentiary issue prior to
Nishikawa, there was no compulsion for the Court to ground the newly adopted
standard in the Constitution; hence, the Court in Nishikawa relied on
Schneiderman.'99 But in 1961, Congress overruled Nishikawa by enacting
section 349(c) which relieved the Government of the heavier burden.20 0 In
Terrazas v. Vance,2"1 the Seventh Circuit questioned Congress' power to
legislate the evidentiary issue. As a result, the Seventh Circuit reinstituted the
burden of proof established in Nishikawa by clearly emphasizing the constitu-
tional imperative for the procedure.
20 2
In reversing the Seventh Circuit, Justice White, the author of the five-man
majority opinion, held that Congress derived the power to pass the statute from
its constitutional grant "to create inferior federal courts."20 3 Upon finding this
rational relationship between constitutional power and congressional action, the
Court saw its task of review completed. Thus, the majority declined to balance
the due process rights of Terrazas against the congressional power to pass the
statute precisely because the Court refused to recognize that the due process
liberty interest of the defendant was implicated: "[E]xpatriation proceedings are
civil in nature and do not threaten a loss of liberty. '20 4 Justice White supported
197. 444 U.S. at 270.
198. 356 U.S. 129 (1958).
199. Id. at 135.
200. 444 U.S. at 467-70.
201. 577 F.2d 7 (7th Cir. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S. 252 (1980).
202. Id. at 10.
203. 444 U.S. 252, 266 (1980) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 1, cl. 8). See also Steadman
v. SEC, 101 S. Ct. 999, 1004 (1981).
204. 444 U.S. at 266 (emphasis added). Contra, id. at 271-72 (Marshall, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part):
The Court's discussion of congressional power to "prescribe rules of evidence and
standards of proof in the federal courts" . . . is the beginning, not the end, of the
inquiry. It remains the task of this Court to determine when those rules and
standards impinge on constitutional rights. . . . And the mere fact that one who has
been expatriated is not locked up in a prison does not dispose of the constitutional
inquiry.
Recognizing that a standard of proof ultimately "reflects the value society places"
on the interest at stake, Addington v. Texas . . . I would hold that a citizen may not
lose his citizenship in the absence of clear and convincing evidence that he intended to
do so.
See also Steadman v. SEC, 101 S. Ct. 999, 1010 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("With all
respect, it seems to me that the Court's decision today lacks the sensitivity that
1981]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
this interpretation by reference to the Nishikawa case: "Nishikawa did not
purport to be a constitutional ruling" involving confrontation with previously
enacted congressional resolutions.
20 5
According to the majority view, no liberty interest attached in the
expatriation proceeding because of the rebuttable presumption in section 349(c)
that the renunciating act of taking an oath of allegiance to a foreign country
was done voluntarily.206 Justice White tempered this holding, however, by
emphasizing that the presumption of voluntariness did not alleviate the
Government's burden of proving that the defendant intended to expatriate
himself: "This in itself is a heavy burden, and we cannot hold that Congress has
exceeded its powers by requiring proof of an intentional expatriating act by a
preponderance of evidence." 20 7 Thus, according to the Court's interpretation of
section 349(c), the defendant need not rebut the presumption of voluntariness if
the Government cannot prove intent by the preponderance standard.
Moreover, the majority countenanced this congressional action by severely
limiting the scope of the citizenship clause in the fourteenth amendment.
Previously, in Afroyim v. Rusk,2 ° s the Court had held that Congress could
neither enlarge nor abridge the definition of citizenship contained in the
fourteenth amendment by legislation which would substantively redefine who
could be a United States citizen.20 9 It would seem, then, that Congress would be
more limited in legislating in the area of expatriation procedure than in the
area of denaturalization procedure, wherein Congress is free to ascertain who is
eligible for naturalization. 210 Yet, only Judge Sprecher of the Seventh Circuit in
Terrazas, and Justice Brennan's dissent to the Supreme Court's opinion,
recognized that by relying on the procedural power to "create inferior federal
courts"21 1 (in stating that a preponderance requirement was sufficient),
Congress had accomplished indirectly what it could not do directly by passage of
substantive legislation redefining who could be a citizen of the United States.
212
To guard against this indirect congressional abuse of power, Justice Brennan
urged that the expatriation statute should apply only in the section 349(a)(6)
situation in which a citizen voluntarily makes a formal renunciation of
American citizenship before a diplomatic officer of the United States.213
Finally, the constitutionally based approach again failed to win the favor of
the Court in Fedorenko v. United States,214 a war criminal denaturalization
traditionally has marked our review of the Government's imposition upon citizens of
severe penalties and permanent stigma.").
205. 444 U.S. at 266. See also Fedorenko v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 737, 747 (1981)
(implicit recognition that the burden of proof set in Schneiderman was not based in the
Constitution).
206. 444 U.S. at 267-70.
207. Id. at 267.
208. 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
209. Id. at 257.
210. U.S. CoNsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
211. Id. at art. 1, § 1, cl. 8.
212. 444 U.S. at 274 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Terrazas v. Vance. 577 F.2d at 10.
213. 444 U.S. at 276 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
214. 101 S. Ct. 737 (1981).
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case. Feodor Fedorenko, a native-born Ukranian, served as an armed guard at
the Treblinka death camp in Poland during 1942 and 1943. In 1949, Fedorenko
sought admission to the United States under the relaxed quota policy of the
Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (DPA).215 Congress had excluded war criminals
from coverage under the DPA,2 16 so Fedorenko lied to the DPA administrators
when specifically asked about his wartime activities. Based on the apparent
propriety of Fedorenko's visa application, the INS admitted him for permanent
residence in the United States. In 1970, Fedorenko's petition for naturalization
was granted on the mistaken premise that he had complied with all the
statutory preconditions of the Act, including the requirement that he was the
bearer of a validly obtained visa.
217
In 1977, the Government filed suit to divest Fedorenko of his citizenship,
alleging the grounds of illegal procurement and misrepresentation. 218 In an
exhaustive but presumptuous opinion, 21 9 Judge Roettger of the Southern
District of Florida held that the Government failed to fulfill its burden of proof.
Alternatively, the district court determined that even if the Government had
met its burden, equity would compel the denaturalization court to ignore
statutory deficiencies because Fedorenko had been a model American citizen. 220
The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the Government had
fulfilled its burden of proof to denaturalize Fedorenko as a matter of law and,
alternatively, that the district court had impermissably exercised its powers in
equity to forgive the defendant for defrauding immigration officials. 2 ' Judge
215. Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009, as amended by Act of June 16, 1950, Pub. L.
No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219 (expired 1952). See note 7 supra.
216. Section 2 of the DPA explicitly denied admission to persons who "(a) have assisted
the enemy in persecuting civil populations" or "(b) voluntarily assisted the enemy forces
... in operations against the United States." See note 8 supra.
217. Fedorenko v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 737, 741-43 (1981).
218. Id. at 743. The Government contended that Fedorenko lied about his experience
as a death camp guard, and, as a result, he concealed his guilt in the torture and murder
of several inmates while a guard at Treblinka.
219. United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 899 (S.D. Fla. 1978), rev'd, 597 F.2d
946 (5th Cir. 1979), aff'd on other grounds, 101 S. Ct. 737 (1981):
The court observed at the trial and iterates here: never in six years on the bench has
the court seen the Government indulge in such expenses. . . . Such expenses of the
taxpayers' treasure and talent have not occurred in this court's . . serious
prosecutions. . . . [Yetj [cilearly the expenditure of the resources of the Executive
Branch lies within the discretion of that branch of the Government.
220. Id. at 917-21. It is interesting that the district court tested the admissibility and
probative value of the evidence against the standards imbedded in criminal law. See, e.g.,
id. at 905. See generally Nesselson & Lubet, Eyewitness Identification in War Crimes
Trials, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 71 (1980). Of further significance, the Supreme Court accepted,
for the limited purpose of deciding the Fedorenko case, the evidentiary findings of the
district court. See Fedorenko v. United States, 101 S. Ct. at n.24.
221. United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946, 951, 953 (1979), aff'd on other grounds,
101 S. Ct. 737 (1981). See generally Comment, Misrepresentation and Materiality in
Immigration Law - Scouring the Melting Pot, 48 FORImIAM L. REv. 471 11980); 74 AM. J.
INT'L L. 186 (1980); Note, Citizenship - Denaturalization - Diminished Protection of
Naturalized Citizenship in Denaturalization Proceedings, United States v. Fedorenko, 14
TEXAS INT'L L.J. 453 (1979).
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Wisdom, author of the Fifth Circuit opinion, specifically overruled the district
court on the proper interpretation of the material misrepresentation standard
set in the 1960 Supreme Court decision of Chaunt v. United States.222 The Fifth
Circuit adopted a more liberal interpretation of the materiality standard,
resulting in a diluted burden of proof on the Government in a denaturalization
case.
2 23
In his sole appearance before the Supreme Court as Attorney General,
Benjamin R. Civiletti argued that the Fifth Circuit's liberal interpretation of
the materiality standard be adopted to resolve the circuit court battle over the
meaning of Chaunt.224 The Court, however, declined to decide the ambiguities
involving the materiality standard and distinguished Chaunt by noting that the
facts in that case covered misrepresentations made in the actual petition for
naturalization, whereas the facts in Fedorenko concerned misrepresentations
made in the initial application for a visa.225 The Court held that if Fedorenko
had revealed that he had been a death camp guard, he would never have been
admitted to the United States regardless of whether he had committed war
crimes while a guard, and regardless of whether his duty as a guard was
voluntary or involuntary on his part.2 2 6
Although this decision could be read as a misrepresentation case, advancing
an interpretation of Chaunt actually at odds with the reasoning of the Fifth
Circuit, 227 Justice Marshall explicitly limited the holding of the Court within
the bounds of pure illegal procurement cases.228 Simply, the DPA barred
Fedorenko from admission to the United States; thus, he never had received a
valid visa. Without a valid visa, Fedorenko did not comply with the statutory
conditions precedent for naturalization. Thus, "one of the 'jurisdictional facts
uponwhich the grant of Icitizenship] is predicated' . . . was missing at the time
petitioner became a citizen. 22" Additionally, Justice Marshall agreed with
Judge Wisdom of the Fifth Circuit that equity would not permit forgiving an act
of fraud which violates the naturalization statute.
23 0
The precedential value of the majority opinion in Fedorenko is both limited
and far-reaching. Read narrowly, the opinion realistically will be binding only
in future war criminal denaturalizations because it is expressly based on
222. 364 U.S. 350 (1960). See 597 F.2d at 949-53.
223. See note 58 supra.
224. Fedorenko v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 737, 740 (1981).
225. Id. at 748-49.
226. Id. at 751. This conclusion was previously rejected by the district court, 455 F.
Supp. at 912-13; the district court's interpretation was not disputed by the court of
appeals, 597 F.2d 946 (1979), nor by the Government on appeal to the Supreme Court,
Fedorenko v. United States, 101 S. Ct. at 751 n.35. In addition, in his dissent, Justice
Stevens agreed with the district court interpretation which implied a "voluntariness"
requirement into section 2(a) of the DPA. Id. at 762.
227. Compare Fedorenko v. United States, 101 S. Ct. at 749 and id. at 754-55
(Blackmun, J., concurring) with United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d at 951.
228. 101 S. Ct. at 752.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 753. But see generally Note, supra note 20.
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statutory interpretation of the DPA, not on interpretation of the immigration
statutes which affect the majority of naturalized citizens.231
Read broadly, however, this decision resurrects the use of the illegal
procurement ground in its pure form in which proof of intentional noncom-
pliance is unnecessary.23 2 Although the use of pure illegal procurement
philosophy is harmless in the Fedorenko case because the Court acknowledged
that Fedorenko intentionally defrauded immigration officials, 233 it is a danger-
ous precedent to set for future cases. The danger lies in the resurgence of a
ground for denaturalization which provides the Government with a relatively
burden-free method with which to denaturalize citizens. For example, in
reciting the now antiquated precedent of the pure illegal procurement cases, 234
Justice Marshall included United States v. Ginsberg,235 wherein the court
denaturalized a citizen because the naturalization judge ordered that the
naturalization hearing take place in his chambers instead of in open court as
required by statute. 236 The Court in Fedorenko should have been mindful that
reliance on pure illegal procurement grounds results in approval of such
outrageous cases as Ginsberg, as well as the more permissible cases such as
Fedorenko.
Moreover, the reluctance to decide the Fedorenko case on grounds of
misrepresentation is interesting because none of the Justices disagreed that the
materiality standard in Chaunt placed a heavy burden of proof on the
Government. 23 7 Because of the practical unanimity of the Court that Chaunt
proposed a strict materiality standard (i.e., a heavier burden of proof on the
Government than that prescribed by the Fifth Circuit), the most troubling
aspect of the case is that this strict interpretation of Chaunt was not linked to
the due process or citizenship clauses of the Constitution. Instead, this apparent
interpretation of Chaunt was disguised as a judicial gloss on a statutory
231. The method of circumscribing the scope of denaturalization cases by interpreta-
tion of statutes applicable to a minority of naturalized citizens has been previously
employed in other decisions. See, e.g., Toyota v. United States, 268 U.S. 402 (1925).
232. In the 1952 version of the Act, Congress deleted the ground of illegal
procurement, thereby placing a uniform requirement that the Government must prove
intent to be triumphant in a denaturalization case. In apparent reaction to the Court's
imposition of a heavy burden of proof, Congress in 1961 once again included the ground of
illegal procurement in the denaturalization statute. Notwithstanding that the Court has
decided few denaturalization cases since the effective date of the 1961 amendment, the
Fedorenko case is the first indication in several decades that the Court will countenance
the denaturalization of a citizen based solely on the ground of illegal procurement. See
note 50 supra.
233. 101 S. Ct. at 748 & n.26.
234. Id. at 747.
235. 243 U.S. 472 (1917).
236. Id. at 475.
237. Thus, disagreement among the Justices was directed solely to whether the
Government had fulfilled its burden of proof, not on how heavy that burden is. Compare




ambiguity. While it is accepted Supreme Court practice to decide disputes on
non-constitutional grounds, the Court should not resort to this practice when its
non-constitutional rationale is merely a shield for a principled constitutional
outcome:
Significantly, this view [of Chaunt] accords with the policy considera-
tions informing the Court's decisions in the area of denaturalization. If
naturalization can be revoked years or decades after it is conferred, on the
mere suspicion that certain undisclosed facts might have warranted
exclusion, I fear that the valued rights of citizenship are in danger of
erosion. If the weaker standard were employed, I doubt that the denatur-
alization process would remain as careful as it has been in the past in
situations where a citizen's allegedly material misstatements were closely
tied to his expression of political beliefs or activities implicating the First
Amendment. . . . [T]he judiciary's task remains the difficult one of
balancing a need to safeguard admission to United States citizenship, in
accord with the will of Congress, against a citizen's right to feel secure in
the exercise of his constitutional freedoms. . . . The Court seems to reject
[the Fifth Circuit] approach, and follows the essential teaching of Chaunt. I
regret only its unwillingness to say so. 2
3 8
This passage in the concurring opinion of Justice Blackmun is the only
indication that the Court has not entirely shirked its responsibility to ground
procedures employed in the overall area of citizenship law in the Constitution.
In essence, the facts in Fedorenko called for a constitutional clarification of
where the clear and unequivocal burden of proof fell on the continuum between
the preponderance and reasonable doubt standards, a question apparently left
unanswered by the Court in Schneiderman. Given that the precedents of
Schneiderman, Woodby, and Terrazas had been woefully deficient in constitu-
tional principles regarding the nature of the applicable burden of proof in
citizenship law, it was not surprising that this clarification in Fedorenko was
veiled in narrow non-constitutional reasoning.
CONCLUSION
Loyalty to the doctrine of stare decisis is a cornerstone of the American
judicial system. In the field of immigration law, the United States Supreme
Court has remained substantially true to the principles of that doctrine
notwithstanding the injustices it many times has created. In a dissenting
opinion, Justice Black aptly stated that:
courts are not omniscient. Like every other human agency, they can profit
from trial and error, from experience and reflection. As others have
demonstrated, the principle commonly referred to as stare decisis has never
been thought to extend so far as to prevent the courts from correcting their
own errors.
2 39
238. Id. at 757-58 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
239. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 195 (1958) (Black, J., dissenting).
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In accord with this sentiment, when the doctrine of stare decisis has seemingly
misguided and paralyzed the United States judicial system, as it has in the vital
area of citizenship rights, then judicial loyalty to stare decisis is misplaced.
Schneiderman"" is a telling instance in which the Supreme Court could
have risen to the challenge of upholding citizenship rights in the area of
procedural due process by a constitutionally based approach. The strength of the
recent Terrazas241 opinion would have been tempered had the Court availed
itself of procedural due process analysis to support past procedural innovations
in citizenship law. And in Fedorenko,2 42 the Court again declined to set a
constitutional precedent which would have protected the procedural rights of
future defendants whose citizenship is at stake. The result is that defendants in
denaturalization suits are forced to rely on analogies to property revocation
proceedings in equity - an insufficient precedent to explain and support the
institution of procedural innovations in a statutory process.
Aside from the need to change the qualitative method by which innovative
procedures are infused into the denaturalization process, there is a more
immediate need for the introduction of quantitatively more procedural safe-
guards for these defendants. In light of recent precedents set in the general area
of immigration law,243 there is little comfort in the knowledge that the Supreme
Court will correct any abuses inherent in the denaturalization procedure in the
near future. Almost thirty years ago, in an entirely different context, Justice
Douglas stated the need for procedural protections in a statement which
transcends these constraints of time and circumstance:
It is not enough to know that the men applying the standard are honorable
and devoted men. This is a government of laws, not of men. . . . It is not
without significance that most of the provisions of the Bill of Rights are
procedural. It is procedure that spells much of the difference between rule
by law and rule by whim or caprice. 24 4
Congress generally defers to the Court when an issue of individual rights arises;
consequently, it would appear that the responsibility has fallen upon the Court
to protect the rights of naturalized citizens24 5 There is a glimmer of hope on the
horizon, however, not from the Court but from Congress.246 In 1978, Congress
240. 320 U.S. 118 (1943) (plurality opinion). See notes 87 to 105 and accompanying
text supra.
241. 444 U.S. 252 (1980). See notes 195 to 213 and accompanying text supra.
242. 101 S. Ct. 737 (1981). See notes 214 to 238 and accompanying text supra.
243. See, e.g., Fedorenko v. United States, 101 S. Ct. 737 (1981); Vance v. Terrazas,
444 U.S. 252 (1980).
244. Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 177, 179 (1951) (Douglas,
J., concurring).
245. See Hertz, Limits to the Naturalization Power, 64 GF.o. L.J. 1007, 1045 (1976)
(arguing that the Court has failed to assert its constitutional power to protect citizenship
rights and has allowed Congress to overstep the limits of its power in this area).
246. See generally, Note, Congressional Power to Enforce Due Process Rights, 80
COLUM. L. REV. 1265, 1266-67 (1980).
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established the Select Committee on Immigration and Refugee Policy.2 47
Recognizing that the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 warranted
considerable scrutiny, the Committee's purpose included possible recommenda-
tions concerning the loss of citizenship. The Committee's final report and
recommendations, however, issued in March, 1981, did not include, any
proposals involving denaturalization.
2 48
In considering the Committee's report, it is hoped that Congress will
recognize the constitutional weaknesses in the denaturalization procedure
currently embodied in section 340 of the Act. Specifically, there are some
glaring features seen most vividly in the war criminal cases that command
remedy. First, the procedure should be taken out of the jurisdiction of equity to
clear the way for constitutionally based procedural innovations and to give
defendants the benefit of a jury trial on the factual issue of misrepresentation.
Second, the ground of illegal procurement should be dropped so that the
Government must prove intentional noncompliance with the Act. Third,
defendants should have assistance of counsel and financial resources made
available to them if they are without funds for an effective defense. Fourth, if
the defendant is an "involuntary" witness, negative inferences should not flow
from his exercise of privilege against self-incrimination. Finally, and most
important, a code for denaturalization procedure should be established which
merges appropriate elements from the traditionally separate spheres of civil and
criminal law. This code would eliminate the mental gymnastics of making
flexible the apparently rigid doctrine that the courts will not infuse precedents
from criminal procedure into civil procedure. A loyalty to labels which sways to
the detriment rather than to the betterment of individual rights makes it
incumbent on the legislators to effect a procedure in which the concern is with
the individual citizen and not with the threat of challenging tradition.
It is further hoped that with the aid of the Congressional response to the
Committee's report and a more enlightened Court, the rights of the alleged war
criminals will not be lost because of unthinking adherence to stare decisis, nor
jeopardized by a race against time. The cry for retribution against war
247. Act of Oct. 5, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-412, 92 Stat. 907.
248. SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION
POLICY AND TIlE NATIONAL INTEREST (March 1, 1981) (Final report and recommendations
submitted to the Congress and the President pursuant to Act of Oct. 5. 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-412, 92 Stat. 907.).
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criminals, who are guilty of inhuman brutality, must be tempered by the
American ideal of justice, particularly because this ideal was conspicuously
absent from the Nazi regime. In the final analysis, the paramount concern is
that the concepts of due process and citizenship rights are continuously honed
and forever maintained.
-"The history of American freedom is, in no small
measure, the history of procedure." '49
-Justice Felix Frankfurter
249. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 414 (1945) (separate opinion).
ADDENDUM: While this comment was at the printer, the Government was victorious in
its denaturalization suits against John Demjanjuk and Wolodymir Osidach and in its
deportation case against Andrija Artukovic. See United States v. Demjanjuk, No. C77-923
(N.D. Ohio, June 23, 1981); United States v. Osidach, No. 79-4212 (ED. Pa., March 17,
1981) (Because of Osidach's death on May 26, 1981, it is doubtful that the defendant's
appeal, Osidach v. United States, No. 81-1956 (3d Cir., filed May 12, 1981), will be
maintained); In re Artukovic, No. A7-095-961 (Bd. Imm. App., July 1, 1981) (Artukovic's
deportation cannot be enforced until resolution of his petition for review. In re Artukovic,
No. 81-7415 (9th Cir., filed July 8, 1981)). Also, the Government dropped its
denaturalization suit against Mykola Kowalchuk, No. 77-119 (E.D. Pa., filed Jan. 13,
1977), on June 5, 1981.
Further, the West German war crimes trial against Hermine Braunsteiner Ryan
recently concluded, more than five-years since its institution. Ryan, the only former
American citizen who has been forced to leave the United States to date, was convicted of
murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. See Piper, 8 Nazi Guards Guiltv in Thousands
of Deaths, Baltimore Sun, July 1, 1981, § 1, at 1, col. 2.
Additionally, the twenty-five cases referred to in the text include the following:
United States v. Palciauskas, No. 81-547-CIV-T-CG (M.D. Fla., filed June 15, 1981)
(denaturalization suit); United States v. von Bolschwing, No. 81-308-MLS (E.D. Cal.,
filed May 27, 1981) (denaturalization suit) (defendant alleged to have concealed wartime
activity as alleged advisor to Eichmann on the matters of Jewish resettlement and
elimination); United States v. Schellong, No. 81-C-1478 (N.D. Ill., filed March 17, 1981)
(denaturalization suit) (defendant alleged to have concealed alleged wartime activity as an
SS guard at the Dachau concentration camp, responsible for training SS recruits for duty
in concentration camps); In re Laipenieks, No. All-937-435 (INS, San Diego, Cal., filed
June 2, 1981) (deportation suit).
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